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11 Introduction
This thesis attempts to shed light on the developments and war in Ukraine in 2014 by 
calculating Vladimir Putin's Operational Code, a psychological profile on foreign policy 
beliefs, during the key moments of the crisis. It follows an assumption that the major 
decisions were ultimately made by Vladimir Putin, and that courses of action he chose 
to pursue were by some extent influenced by his beliefs. Additionally, an attempt is 
made to track any changes in Putin's beliefs during the crisis, which will help us 
understand of the effects of different events on Putin's psychological profile. The 
primary question is, did the Western sanctions have any effect on Putin's beliefs on 
international politics?
1.1 War in Ukraine
In May 2012 Vladimir Putin began his third term and second spell as the Russian head 
of state. For all intents and purposes, he became the final arbiter of Russian foreign 
policy. Scholars of International Relations (IR) and foreign policy have since mulled 
over the future of international security and pondering what role could Russia play in 
maintaining it, or disrupting it. His predecessor and the current Prime Minister, Dmitry 
Medvedev, presided over the Georgian war in 2008 to the dismay of many, who hoped 
that Russia might be fully integrated to the European security system, and that 
memories of cold war and Russian-Western antagonism might be buried for good. On 
the other hand, Russian accession to World Trade Organization in 2012 after long 
negotiations sparked hopes that the economic integration with the world might forge 
ties so strong between the community of states it entails, that further wars might be 
avoided. The notion that economic cooperation fosters peace is an old one, and can be 
traced back at least as far as to Immanuel Kant, whose dream of "perpetual peace" in 
Europe and the world beyond is now as elusive as it ever was. The irony of the situation 
is, that it may have been issues of economic cooperation that caused Russia to move 
against Ukraine in order to protect its own national interests.
The European Union had begun negotiations with Ukraine in 2007 for an 
agreement of closer economic cooperation, which resulted in a draft of Association 
2Agreement that would integrate Ukrainian economy more closely with the European 
Union. On a parallel path, Russia had been leading the development of the Eurasian 
economic integration under the umbrella of Customs Union, which in January 2015 was 
expanded and renamed into Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Ukraine is Russia's most 
important trade partner in the post-Soviet space, but it was not a member. The issue was 
not about simple economic cooperation. Both Russia and EU had hopes for a closer 
political integration. Inclusion of Ukraine was an integral part of Russia's strategy to 
create an economic and political bloc that could compete with the EU. The stakes were 
high.1 
Ukraine was leaning towards Europe. While negotiations had stalled over the 
years, it was widely expected that in 2013 the Ukrainian Parliament could have passed 
the political motions required by the Association Agreement before it could take force. 
In the late Summer 2013 Russia started to adopt series of measures, which disrupted 
trade between Ukraine and Russia.2 In November 2013, Russia issued a warning to 
Ukraine that it would respond if any further measures that would align Ukraine closer 
to Western Europe were implemented. It also offered a $ 15 billion loan to save the 
Ukrainian economy from bankruptcy, a deal that the EU would not match. The 
Ukrainian government chose Russia, and the motions for Association Agremeent were 
never passed. This sparked the Euromaidan protests that led to the overthrow of 
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his government in late February 2014. 
Suddenly, the Association Agreement was back on table, and Russia had played its 
hand. The time for talk was over, and Putin chose stronger measures.3 Soon after, 
Russian military occupied the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which 
then voted to secede from Ukraine and immediately applied to join Russian Federation. 
Their accession to Russian Federation was accepted by Russian State Duma in March 
21th 2014. 
In Ukraine the new post-revolution government under Prime Minister Arseniy 
Jatsenyuk signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement treaty in March 
23th 2014. Around this time, Russian government-owned energy company Gazprom 
1 Pomeranz, William E. (2016): Ground Zero. How a Trade Dispute Sparked the Russia-Ukraine  
Crisis. In Wood, Elizabeth A. – Pomeranz William E. – Merry, Wayne E. – Trudolyubov, Maxim: 
Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine. Columbia University Press, New york, 57-58.
2 Menon, Rajan – Rumer, Eugene (2015): Conflict in Ukraine. The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War  
Order. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 77.
3 Pomeranz, William E. 2016, 61-64.
3cancelled two large discounts for the price of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) it sells to 
Ukraine, which in effect doubled the gas price overnight. The new price is among the 
highest in Europe and significantly higher compared to what many other former Eastern 
Bloc countries pay.
Donbass region in the Eastern Ukraine experienced civil unrest soon after. 
Russian-minded Separatists in the cities of Luhansk and Donetsk occupied government 
buildings and later declared these two areas independent republics. For all intents and 
purposes, the crisis escalated into an open war, with the military action confided in the 
eastern areas of the country. Initially, military forces of the Ukrainian government 
managed to gain early victories, reaching the outskirts of Luhansk and Donetsk. 
However, Russia remained commited to to its goals and saved the Separatists by 
intervening in August 2014. It sent in troops, munitions and supplies, and led a 
counterattack that defeated the forces of the Ukrainian government. This led to a 
ceasefire of the First Minsk Accords in early September 2014.4 
Russia has continued to provide material aid and troops to the Separatist side, 
while the United States and the EU have supported Ukraine, introducing sanctions 
against Russia after it annexed Crimea. Sanctions were initially largely symbolic, but 
they started to target the Russian economy and military technology directly, after a 
missile shot from Separatist territory destroyed a civilian aircraft in July 2014. Russia 
introduced counter-sanctions in response, and neither side has since backed. The full 
extent of Russia's involvement in military operations still uncertain, but it is thought to 
be considerable. It has been accused of being engaged in war against Ukraine, a claim 
that Russia continues to dispute. As of May 2016, war in Ukraine has shown no signs of 
final resolution. 
1.2 Leaders and Leadership in World Politics
Research on international relations and foreign policy has long been fascinated by the 
mind of the leader. The founder of Classical Realism, Hans Morgenthau, famously 
suggested that Realist scholars could to understand decisions of leaders as if they were 
4 Menon – Rumer, 85-86.
4there to look over their shoulders and thinking their thoughts.5 Realism, however, 
attaches essential characteristics to human beings, such as self-interest, which are then 
used to analyze leaders' approach to politics. The primary subject ends up being the 
state, as these characteristics are easier to attach to it. This uniform approach was met 
with increasing dissatisfaction, and it led to the first systematic effort to understand how 
beliefs affect foreign policy decision-making by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin.6 They 
equated state action with action of its decision-makers, which allowed beliefs and 
perceptions to take precedence.7 Early foundations of Operational Code analysis were 
also set at this time, when Nathan Leites adopted psychoanalytical methods to study the 
political strategy of Soviet Politburo.
The notion that beliefs matter in international relations has been heavily 
contested by  Structuralist scholars. Kenneth Waltz's Neorealist theory rejects the 
possibility that individuals are a reasonable unit of analysis in international relations. 
Neorealism holds that human nature drives the international society into a perpetual 
anarchy that operates according to predictable laws. According to this view, states have 
to act rationally, or they will simply not survive. The survival instinct is the prime 
mover of state action.8 On the other hand, a Constructivist theory by Alexander Wendt 
accepts that an anarchical international system guides international politics, but 
suggests that its nature is determined by its culture rather than by human nature.9 These 
theorists analyze states and the international system, rather than leaders.
In a similar manner, the Structuralist tradition by led Waltz has again been 
recently challenged by political scientists on the grounds that it treats human nature as a 
constant, when, in fact, it is not. Byman and Pollack argue that, instead of actors with 
uniform characteristics, a variety of different personalities occupy highest political 
offices and approach foreign policy in a number of different ways. Once we accept that 
human nature does not constrain action, and that variety of different personalities that 
may occupy highest positions in government hierarchy, the argument that individuals 
5 Morgenthau, Hans (2005): Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th  ed., 
revised by Thompson, Kenneth W. – Clinton, David W. McGraw Hill, Boston, 5.
6 Smith, Steve (1988): Belief Systems and the Study International Relations. In Little, Richard – Smith, 
Steve (eds): Belief Systems and International Relations. Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, 14-15.
7 Snyder, Richard S – Bruck, H. W. – Sapin, Burton (1962): Decision-Making as an Approach to the  
Study of International Politics. In Snyder, Richard S – Bruck, H. W. – Sapin, Burton (eds): Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making. An Approach to the Study of International Politics. The Free Press of 
Glencoe, New York, 65.
8 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill, Boston, 65-66, 89-91.
9 Wendt, Alexander (1999): Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 247, 249-250, 257-258.
5matter becomes more convincing.10
This view has been met with increasing support, despite systematic approaches 
dominating in the IR field. Research on foreign policy aknowledges that structure alone 
cannot account for decision-making. Hermann and Hermann posit that among 
government authorities, there is always the "'ultimate decision unit'", that is the final 
arbiter of foreign policy. Besides a predominant leader, it may be a single group of 
people, or an unit of multiple autonomous actors. This view has ultimately been 
accepted by Wendt as well.11 Hermann and Hermann suggest that the nature of the 
decision unit will have important effects on the foreign policy. If the decision-making 
power is in the hands of a single leader, it important to learn about personal 
characteristics of the leader, because they will influence his or her foreign policy.12
A new study by Fredrik Dosser suggests that even cabinet members in 
democratic governments can initiate changes in long-term foreign policy orientation, 
provided that they are skilled politicians, have strong political convictions and a 
window of opportunity to realize them.13 For genuinely authoritarian rulers this 
checklist of demands should logically be shorter, as windows of opportunity are open 
much longer. Operational Code analysis in this sense, is especially well suited to 
analysing leaders like Putin, who has taken an active role in shaping Russia's foreign 
policy.
Operational Code analysis has also lent support to some of these claims. Malici 
and Malici compared belief changes of North Korean and Cuban leaders Kim Il Sung 
and Fidel Castro before and after the end of the Cold War. Their beliefs remained 
relatively stable, and the authors suggest that changes in their respective foreign 
policies were probably due to a behavioral adaption to the new structural environment 
of post-Cold War world. However, the fact that foreign policies of these countries 
remained erratic, and lasting changes were not achieved, is consistent with their 
stagnated beliefs.14 This leads Malici and Malici to state that structural changes do not 
provide a sufficient explanation, and conclude that "changes in foreign policy will be 
10 Byman, Daniel L. – Pollack, Kenneth M (2001): Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the  
Statesman Back In. In International Security, Vol. 25, No 4 (Spring 2001), 112.
11 Wendt 204-205.
12 Hermann, Margaret G. – Hermann, Charles F. (1989): Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and  
How: An Empirical Inquiry. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 362-365.
13 Dosser, Fredrik (2013): Leader-driven foreign-policy change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War. In 
International Political Science Review, 34(5), 585-586.
14 Malici, Akan – Malici, Johnna (2005): The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The  
Last Cold Warriors? In Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2005, 404.
6missing in absence of change at the individual level15.
The notion that leaders matter is not as contested as many suggest. Waltz 
explicitly denied the possibility that Neorealism could be used to study foreign policy 
effectively. He considers its aim functionally different: Neorealism explains why states 
behave similarly in the international system, and a theory of foreign policy would 
explain their differences.16 However, many Realists and other IR theorists do not agree 
with this view and continue to analyze foreign policy. Operational code analysts He and 
Feng point out the problems of most IR theories, when they attempt to predict the 
foreign policy orientations of different countries. Realism tends to regard states more or 
less alike. The primary variable that explains their foreign policy behavior is power and 
related material factors. While some Realisms do agree that there are different types of 
states, revisionist and status quo powers, the criteria to assess their nature is not clearly 
communicated. The underlying assumption that leaders are all alike still remains, 
limiting the possibility of conclusions. For theoretical purposes at least, their 
differences do not matter, and are routinely ignored. While Constructivists aknowledge 
the importance of ideas, they are treated more or less like cultural trends in the 
international system instead of beliefs held by individuals, leaving the latter unnoticed.17 
While Wendt claims that "'states are people too'", it cannot be said that their 
depersonalized nature has no problems when analyzing foreign policy. This fact also 
acknowledged by Wendt, who uses this phrase to support a theory of state.18 When a 
state is under scrutiny instead of its leader, the level of analysis takes a step or two away 
from the particular towards the general. Thse problems are also acknowledged by 
Realists. As Mearsheimer freely admitted, a theory that simplifies reality sometimes has 
to leave out factors that may "dominate a state's decision-making process." In his 
example, it made a world of difference for world politics that it was Hitler who led 
Germany in the latter part of the interwar period.19
15 Malici – Malici, 407.
16 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1996): International politics is not foreign policy. In Security Studies, Vol. 6, no. 
1, 1996, 54.
17 He Kai – Feng Huiyun (2013): Xi Jinping's Operational Code Beliefs and China's Foreign Policy. In 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, 2013, 211-217.
18 Wendt, 194-195.
19 Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company, New 
York and London, 11.
71.3 Beliefs in Decision-Making Process
 
Besides structural IR theories, psychological approach to foreign policy has also been 
challenged by a variety of Rationalist approaches. Roots of these models spring from 
microeconomics. They assume that actors have a number of preferences that may be 
ranked according to the satisfaction they provide. Rational actor is often assumed to be 
able to recognize alternative options and their consequences prior to selecting the best 
possible option in any given situation. These models boast considerable explanatory 
power and while they probably are most often associated with economics, they have 
been used in the study of foreign policy decision-making as well. Scholars typically 
distinguish between thin and thick rationality, where thin rationality assumes a strategic 
pursuit of goals according to ordered preferences. Thick rationality assumes that all 
actors share preferences, which are mostly related to self-interest, survival and other 
base needs20. Often it also assumes that actors have complete information of their 
environment and that they act accordingly.21
In the context of foreign policy decision-making, political psychology has 
challenged especially the thick variant of Rationalism. During the so called cognitive 
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s  researchers discovered that motivated biases, or 
motivated reasoning, affect actor's capacity to weigh options objectively22. Decision-
making does not happen in a vacuum, and it is connected to emotional needs of the 
decision-maker. In world politics, this leads leaders to rationalize and employ polices 
that enforce one's own interests and emotional needs. In short, it leads to "'wishful 
thinking'". Levy points out that the decisions most affected by this bias are ones that 
involve high stakes, which makes this concept especially useful for foreign policy 
analysis.23 While this revelation points to the conclusion that beliefs primarily cloud 
judgment, recent advances in neuroscience have proven that emotions are critical in 
making sound and seemingly rational decisions as well. Jonathan Mercer reports that 
human beings, who somehow lack emotions, function differently even in everyday life 
20 Mintz, Alex – DeRouen, Karl (2010): Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 57-59.
21 Wendt, 118.
22 For more information about biases in foreign policy, see Minzt, Alex – DeRouen Karl, 38-54.
23 Levy, Jack S. (2013): Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision Making. In Huddy, Leonie – Sears, 
David O. – Levy Jack S. (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. 2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 309.
8situations.24
The implementation of a foreign policy is very complex phenomenon with a 
number of different stages. Typically, a new policy is a response to a new threat, an 
opportunity or a problem. It is preceded by several stages of decision-making, during 
which a leader has to process information and make choices. Before choosing a 
corresponding policy, decision-makers have to have some initial expectations 
concerning the policy, that is, what they hope to achieve. Later on, a need to revise the 
policy may arise, due to new developments and initially unavailable information 
becoming available. New opportunities may arise, and alternative means to solve the 
problem may suddenly look more advantageous.25 All of these stages require leaders to 
make judgments on the proper course of action, which they cannot do without their 
beliefs. From the point of view of psychology, pure rationality is an insufficient 
concept, as a completely objective image of reality is simply impossible to develop.26
Challenging the thick Rationalist theory27, Goldstein and Keohane have written 
about the effect of ideas specifically on foreign policy. Their central argument is that 
ideas influence foreign policy, because they help actors in control understand the world 
with more clarity, especially with regards to ends-means relationship. When leaders are 
trying to achieve something, they have to have an idea of how exactly they are going to 
do it. These beliefs on what accounts for proper and efficient conduct are not 
universally shared, which explains the variety methods employed to reach foreign 
policy goals.28
The above assumptions are generally agreed by Operational Code analysts. 
Renshon points out that beliefs essentially act as a "filter", through which reality is 
experienced by leaders. It affects how they perceive the world around them.29 There are, 
however, major differences in what an ideational approach to foreign policy and 
contemporary Operational Code analysis attempt to explain. While both approaches 
24 Mercer, Jonathan (2005): Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. In International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), 92-94.
25 Hermann, Charles F. (1990): Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign  
policy. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No 1, 14-19.
26 Little, Richard – Smith, Steve (1988): Introduction. In Little, Richard – Smith Steve (eds): Belief  
Systems and International Relations. Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, 5.
27 Wendt, 118.
28 Goldstein, Judith – Keohane, Robert O. (1993): Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. 
In Goldstein, Judith  – Keohane, Robert O. (eds): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and  
Political Change. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 4.
29 Renshon, Jonathan (2008): Stability and Change in Belief Systems. The Operational Code of George  
W. Bush. In Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2008, 822.
9concern state level foreign policy, the Goldstein and Keohane focus on particular ideas 
and beliefs that are shared by great many people, such as general moral principles.30 
They can be very specific, such as a shared belief in the effectiveness of a certain 
economic policy, a normative support of anti-colonialism or a belief in human rights as 
a communal responsibility of all nations31. These beliefs, however, can concern 
outcomes of long-term foreign policy orientation. More or less, ideas are thought to 
work much like institutions that induce path-dependency.32 In the case of Ukrainian war, 
a scholar utilizing an ideational approach on foreign policy might be interested in the 
certain assumptions concerning Russia's responsibility to safeguard Russian speakers 
worldwide, Russia's relations with NATO and EU, and how Russia generally speaking 
sees its place in the world. However, for a short-term variation of beliefs within the time 
frame of the crisis, the above questions do not lead us closer to the answers that we are 
looking for. In the case of this thesis, it is hard to determine which collective beliefs are 
truly shared by Putin, and how they affect the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.
30 Goldstein – Keohane, 6-7.
31 Goldstein – Keohane, 14-16.
32 Goldstein – Keohane, 12.
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2 Operational Code Analysis
Rather than to analyze decision-making in itself, this thesis focuses on analyzing the 
world view and fundamental beliefs of Vladimir Putin. Operational code analysis was 
chosen as the method of the thesis due to its ability to provide specific research 
questions. While the entire world view of a person cannot be reduced into a few short 
questions, Operational Code analysis seeks answers to the ones that are most interesting 
and relevant to foreign policy decision-making. The goal of this thesis is not to reveal 
the inner workings and motivations of the Russian president but to provide clear and 
concise information on some key beliefs that influence his decision-making. I consider 
this method to be extremely well suited to analyzing an actor like Putin, since, even 
among his peers in world politics, he is relatively powerful in shaping the course of the 
foreign policy of his country. It should be fair to assume that Putin is less constrained 
than other presidents and premiers are, when decisions are being made.
 Usage of Operational Code analysis also avoids the pitfall of focusing on 
specific subjects, which might not yield reliable information in other cases. Common 
sense would indicate that a few quotations taken out of context might not provide 
reliable information on fundamental beliefs of political actors. This is doubly true for 
figures like Putin, whose occasional use of aggressive rhetoric provides quotable 
material in great quantities and often draws the attention to themselves from other 
things. Conversely, this thesis attempts to put quotes into the context. In my opinion, 
research of this kind has to go beyond the surface level. Contemporary Operational 
Code analysis can process a large pool of source material effectively, which is 
something that many qualitative methods are not capable of. While the quantitative 
method might suffer from certain methodological weaknesses, highlighting qualitative 
key information from the data is not prohibited and will done where applicable.
2.1.1 Qualitative Foundations
The Operational Code (Opcode) is best explained as a set of beliefs, or a belief system, 
which an individual forms to understand the political world. The term "Operational 
Code", is however, a misleading one in important ways, since it incorrectly suggests "a 
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set of recipes or repertoires for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its 
decision-making."33 Alexander George notes that simply knowing that the subject has a 
belief system does not lead to predictive powers or simple explanations about his or her 
actions. It also does not take into account external forces such as institutional pressure 
that might affect political actors at the time of decision-making.34 He even suggested 
changing the label into something that would have better described a belief system of a 
political actor such as, "'approaches to political calculation'", which indeed would have 
been a more accurate term for the method.35 Students of operational code have since 
followed George's approach and line of reasoning in this case, although a new name for 
the method never materialized.
While the term Operational Code had existed before, it did not reach wide 
attention until Nathan Leites introduced the concept into political psychology in the 
early 1950s when his research on the political strategy of  the ruling elite of Soviet 
Union was published in two parts36. An abridged version of the results of Leites's 
research was published first in 1951 as The Operational Code of the Politburo and the 
complete work was unveiled in 1953 as A Study of Bolshevism. Leites found that 
members of the Soviet Politburo had shared beliefs about certain political axioms, 
which lead to a unified political strategy.37 This was apparent, for example, in the Soviet 
communication strategy in 1948 between Moscow Politburo and Yugoslavian 
communists, which followed closely followed pre-1930s strategy.38
 Leites used the term "Operational Code" to refer to basic approach to politics. 
Beliefs were part of this greater whole, and he neither established a connection between 
different ones nor did he attempt to organize them hierarchically. As far as Soviet elite 
was concerned, these beliefs were also thought to be integrally linked to his concept of 
ideal type Bolshevik, which led him to the use of psychonalysis.39 Already in the 1950s, 
there were some concerns that the conclusions of his research were entirely dependent 
on interpretation, especially with regards to psychonanalysis. Furthermore, Leites never 
33 George, Alexander L. (1969): The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of  
Political Leaders and Decision-Making. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, 191.
34 George, 200.
35 George, 220.
36 Walker, Stephen G. (1990): The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis. In Political Psychology, Vol. 
11, No. 2, 403.
37 Walker, Stephen G. 1990,  404.
38 Leites, Nathan (1951): The Operational Code of the Politburo. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New 
York, xiv.
39 Smith, Steve, 21.
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set down a criteria for picking his supporting evidence from Russian literature, which 
was met with criticism.40 Issues of reliability that come with Leites's exclusively 
qualitative approach has also been also acknowledged by later research.41
While Leites's research attracted attention and even enthusiasm after its 
publication, his method did not attract a real following until Alexander George refined 
Leites's complex approach into a more lean and workable method in 1969. George 
isolated the concept of Operational Code from the greater whole of A Study of  
Bolshevism, focusing solely on beliefs of as a part of the political strategy. 
Psychoanalysis was abandoned in the process, as it was simply not a necessary tool to 
analyze beliefs.42
2.1.2 Conceptualization and Research Questions
George conceptualized the Operational Code according to certain thin rationalist 
assumptions. He attested that leader's mentality, beliefs, world view and even the 
political culture view will influence his or her decision-making. Operational Code 
construct attempts to study these belief systematically. It cannot include all beliefs or 
factors that influence decision-making, but it is designed to capture a significant part of 
them. According to George, rational decision-making has inherent cognitive limits. He 
argued against extreme Rationalist theories by pointing out that political actors have 
usually incomplete information about situations they find themselves in, and that their 
ability predict the consequences of their actions is limited. Actors have often trouble 
assessing which course of action is objectively speaking the best one. Dealing with 
uncertainty requires political actors to work in environments, where they are not 
completely in control. Adaptation is necessary. George suggested that political actors, 
like other individuals, need to simplify and structure the world around them in order to 
comprehend it and to cope with it. Pure rationality is an insufficient concept for this, 
and leaders turn to their beliefs instead. However Operational Code does not detach 
itself completely from the concept of rationality. Instead, George proposed that different 
actors might have different beliefs and assumptions about best approaches to foreign 
40 Fischer George (1954): A Book review. In The Western Political Quarterly Vol. 07, No3,  Sep 1954, 
494-496.
41 Walker, Stephen G. 1990, 407.
42 George, 195.
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policy.43
George refined Operational Code into ten research questions about a subject's 
views about politics. When analyzed together, they provide a clear picture of the 
subject's political approach to solving the problems of uncertainty in decision-making. 
Contemporary Operational Code research, including this thesis, is based on the 
questions formulated by George, albeit with slight variations. Five of the questions deal 
with the philosophical nature of the political universe, that is, how the political actor 
perceives the world around him. The five following five deal with instrumental issues, 
that is, how to cope with the perceived nature of the political existence. This distinction 
helps to define how the subject sees Self and Other in the political world. The questions 
are outlined below:
The Philosophical Content of an Operational Code
1. What is the "essential nature of political life? Is the political universe  
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of  
one's political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental  
political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be  
pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development?  
What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction"
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued more effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?
43 George, 197-200.
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5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?44
The specific research questions makes the Operational Code analysis relatively robust, 
but allows a number of ways to answer to research questions. George advocated 
pragmatism in methodological choices and data acquisition, pointing out that both 
qualitative or quantitative methods, may be useful when conducting this type of 
research.45
George assumed that the first philosophical belief has subtle ripple effects on the 
rest. The perception of the nature of politics also influences beliefs on what is possible, 
what are the key threats and what should be done with them.46 The point of view was 
taken further by Ole Holsti, who constructed a typology of six ideal type Operational 
Codes based on the ten questions formulated by Alexander George. Holsti concluded 
that the belief about the nature of political life (harmonious/conflictual) acts as a 
"'master'" belief that influences other beliefs as well. The belief on fundamental sources 
of conflict (human nature/attributes of nations/international system) acts as another 
anchor to form an ideal type Operational Code. These ideal types are essentially thought 
to be political belief systems.47 Walker then suggested that it is possible condense 
Holsti's typology into four types, without a a significant loss of reliability, as three types 
share the master belief of the conflictual nature of international politics. It leads them 
into agreemeent about a number of other beliefs as well.48 This typology has recently 
found use in contemporary game theory analysis. In keeping with the methods thin 
rationalist tradition, Operational Code analysis suggests that the belief system of a 
leader influences his or her choice of moves.49
However, Walker reports that further research conducted on Operational Codes 
of former American leaders found a series of hybrid types, which conformed neither to 
Holsti typology nor to its revised version. The tactics used by decision-makers tended to 
correlate with the discovered set of beliefs, even if the beliefs themselves did not form 
an unified belief system, as it is understood by cognitive psychology, or as George and 
44 George, 201-216.
45 George, 221.
46 George, 201-202.
47 Walker, Stephen G. (1983): The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis  
of the Operational Code Construct. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No 2, 181-182.
48 Walker, Stephen G. 1983, 185-186.
49 Walker, Stephen G. – Schafer, Mark (2006) Belief Systems as Causal Mechanism in World Politics:  
An Overview of Operational Code Analysis. In Walker, Stephen G. – Schafer, Mark (eds): Beliefs and 
Leadership in World Politics. Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis. Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 13.
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Holsti seemed to expect. This discovery constituted a problem for Operational Code 
research, as it had assumed a self-reinforcing and relatively robust belief system. 
Walker proposed to develop the method further by establishing a stronger connection to 
motivational and cognitive psychology, which led to the creation of a new quantitative 
method that does not expect an unified belief system.50
2.2 The Quantitative Method
2.2.1 Verbs In Context System (VICS)
This thesis uses as its primary of method of analysis Verbs in Context System (VICS) 
which was developed by Walker, Schafer and Young. in 1998. They suggested that 
Operational Code should be understood more as alternative "'states of mind'" rather 
than as an unified and a relatively stable construct touching multitude of issues. This 
paradigm shift was supported by new discoveries made in the field of cognitive 
psychology and the mixed results that previous Operational Code analysis had 
provided.51  The new theoretical context allowed Walker, et al. to create this new 
quantitative method of analysis, which investigates a separate set of beliefs instead of 
an internally coherent Operational Code of proposed by Holsti and George. However, 
VICS still recocgnizes that some beliefs are more important than others. In addition to 
first philosophical belief, contemporary Operational Code analysis suggests that the 
first instrumental belief acts as another master belief to its corresponding set of beliefs, 
subtly influencing them.52
VICS calculates indices based on Alexander George's ten questions. The leader's 
Operational Code is illustrated by the numerical values provided by indices. The 
justification for the existence of each index varies slightly, but there are few common 
denominators that provide evidence for the validity of the scoring system as a whole. 
The first one is the authors' concept of power, which in the case of VICS refers to the 
interplay of control relationships between Self and Other in the political universe. 
50 Walker, Stephen G. 1990,  411-412.
51 Walker, Stephen G. – Schafer, Mark – Young, Michael D (1998): Systematic Proceduders for  
Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code. In 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, 176.
52 Schafer, Mark – Walker Stephen G. (2006): Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in  
Context System of Content Analysis. In Walker, Stephen G. – Schafer, Mark (eds): Beliefs and 
Leadership in World Politics. Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis. Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 33, 50.
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Walker et al. place a heavy emphasis on the action and information transfer, positive or 
negative, from Self towards Other and vice versa. Therefore, VICS system focuses on 
the way the leader sees Self and Other in the political universe. The second focus is on 
the usage of verbs in the rhetoric of the subject. Verbs in the leader's rhetoric indicate 
the perceived manifestations of different forms of power.VICS calculates its indices 
from transitive verbs in particular, as they represent the connection between Self and 
Other, and represents the leader's perception of the nature of the relationship between 
them. Additionally, Walker, et al. draw from cognitive psychology in asserting the 
importance of direction of actions that are associated with the concept of power. 
Direction of the transitive verb indicates how the leader perceives the question of 
control: does Self affect Other or vice versa?53 Finally, Operational Code analysis 
attempts to provide explanation to the state's management of conflict with the 
approaches its leader takes to exercise of power.54
2.2.2 VICS Indices
VICS indices have remained unchanged since they were first created by Schafer et al. 
They are based on utterances, spoken or written, by the subject, in this case Vladimir 
Putin. An utterance, as understood by VICS, consists of the subject and the verb.55 Each 
sentence in the primary source material is coded to identify its subject (Self/Other) and 
the tense of the transitive verb (past/present/future). The category of the verb is then 
determined. It can either be cooperative (+) or conflictual (-). The intensity of the verb 
is further classified according to the the intensity and nature of the exercise of power: 
Punish (-3), Threaten (-2), Resist (-1), Support (+1), Promise (+2), Reward (+3).56 The 
division is fairly straightforward. Verb of extreme intensity (+3/-3) signify deeds, as do 
all verbs in the past tense, since they indicate that something has already happened. 
Verb of moderate and low intensity (from -2 to +2) represent mere words. The intensity 
between them is based on whether they invoke further action (Threaten/Promise) or not 
(Resist/Support). Neutral verbs are given the value of zero and are not accounted for in 
53 This approach seems to draw inspiration from Leites's fndings, in particular  from "who affects 
whom" -question, which was a cornerstone of Soviet political strategy. See George, 202.
54 Walker – Schafer – Young, 177.
55 Schafer, Mark – Walker Stephen G, 32.
56 Walker – Schafer – Young, 183.
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the analysis, as they do not give any indication of direction and intensity.57 A sentence 
"Russia has annexed Crimea" would then in this thesis be coded as Russia (Self) has 
annexed (-3) Crimea.
The aggregated results are the compiled into a collection indices. Mathematical 
equations that calculate each index is provided in Appendix 1. The description for each 
index is adapted from Schafer and Walker58, and the criteria and reasoning behind each 
index is described below:
P-1. The Nature of the Political Universe: Friendly, Mixed, Hostile. This is the master 
belief of the philosophical part of Operational Code. Other beliefs in the philosophical 
realm are linked to it. Operational Code assumes that the leader's image of other actors, 
their policies and actions reflect his or her beliefs about political conflict and nature of 
politics itself. The index calculates the leader's perception about cooperative or 
conflictual nature of Other. A low score indicates a belief that other are hostile, and a 
positive one that they are friendly. The index varies between -1 and +1.
P-2. Prospect of Realizing Fundamental Values: Optimism versus Pessimism. This 
index is based on the leader's perception of the intensity of actions of others. High 
amount of hostile deeds induces pessimism, while a high number friendly deeds induces 
an optimistic view about realization of political values. Transitive verbs by Other are 
weighed according to intensity (from -3 to +3) and the index varies from -1 to +1.
P-3. Predictability of Political Universe: Low to High. This index tracks leader's 
perception about predictability and consistence of actions of others. High variance of 
actions causes a low score while consistency leads to a high score. This index varies 
between 0 and 1. High scores indicate a greater belief in predictability.
P-4. Control over Historical Development: Low to High. This index reveals who the 
leader believes to be in control of political universe. It is based on the number actions 
Self and Other take in the leader's rhetoric. If Self takes action most of the time, the 
leader believes himself or herself to be in control. High number of actions by others 
leads to an opposite conclusion. This index varies between 0 and 1.
P-5. Role of Chance in Politics: Low to High. This index is based on the two previous 
ones. If the leader believes himself or herself to be in control, and the political universe 
to be predictable, the role of chance is logically lower and vice versa. This index varies 
57  Schafer, Mark – Walker Stephen G, 31.
58 For more extensive explanations, see Schafer, Mark – Walker, Stephen G, 32-38.
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between 0 and 1. A high number indicates a belief in the high role of chance.
I-1. Direction of Strategy (I-1): Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual. This is the master 
belief of the instrumental part of Operational Code. It illustrates the leader's beliefs 
about the best course of action in politics. It is based on the nature of Self's actions in 
the leader's rhetoric. If the leader talks about taking cooperative actions, then more 
value is based on cooperative actions and vice versa. This index varies from -1 to +1.
I-2. Intensity of Tactics. This index tracks the leader's belief about the intensity of 
tactics. Verbs refering to Self are weighed from -3 to +3. The index reveals the average 
level of intensity, with extreme verbs having more effect on it than mild ones. The index 
varies from -1 to +1, with negative scores indicating a belief in the utility of hostile 
tactics and and positive scores indicating a belief in the opposite.
I-3. Risk Orientation: Averse to Acceptant. This index reveals the leader's belief about 
risk taking. High variety of different actions means that risks associated with any one 
type of action are smaller. Index varies between 0 and 1. Low scores indicate risk 
aversity and result from a diverse rhetoric. High score indicates that the leader employs 
smaller variety of tactics and is consequently more risk acceptant.
I-4. Importance of Timing of Actions: Low to High Flexibility. This index is split into 
two. The first one (I-4a) tracks the diversity of leader's tactics based on the distribution 
of cooperative and conflictual actions. The second one is based on the diversity of 
words and deeds in the leader's rhetoric. The indices vary from 0 to 1, with high scores 
indicating a more heterogeneous approach to tactics, and low scores indicating a low 
diversity of tactics. These indices also indicate risk management related to tactical 
choices. I-4a balances the risk of being dominated to the risk of deadlock, while I-4b 
illustrates the risk of doing too much versus not doing enough.
I-5. Utility of Means. Low to High. These indices calculate the relative amount of 
different actions of Self in leader's rhetoric. More instances indicate, that the leader 
believes the type of action to be useful. Each Verb is coded according to intensity and 
then divided by the sum of all verbs. Indices vary from 0 to 1, but as each index is 
weighed by the total of six tactics, average belief score is around 0,16. Scores 
noticeably higher than that indicate a belief in high utility of the tactic and lower scores 
vice versa.
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2.2.3 Approaches to Coding
Coding was initially done by hand until a specific software for VICS was developed, 
which allowed the program to use dictionaries to code the text automatically. Both 
approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. The greatest virtue of 
automated coding is the ability to process large quantities of data quickly and 
efficiently. However, as the software processes the data according to pronouns found in 
the data, Self-indicators in third person remain undetected, distorting results by ignoring 
Self's relevant in-groups. This can be dealt with by editing the text. Additionally, while 
the possibility of computer errors in coding cannot be ruled out, an automated software 
would make the same error every time. Therefore, the error would not affect the 
reliability of comparisons between different studies, which use the same automated 
coding scheme. Coding by hand, while potentially being the most accurate method, 
suffers from a greater possibility of errors. Each coding decision has to be made by the 
researcher, which means that political biases, fatigue, and and other human errors can 
affect the result.59 This question is especially relevant in this study, as I have no prior 
experience with VICS. Coding by hand might lead to a high number of mistakes.
For the above reasons, this thesis uses an automated coding software, Profiler 
Plus V. 5.8.4, with coding schemes for V. 5.3.4. These are provided by Social Sciences 
Automation. Inc. (www.socialsciencesautomation.com).  The pool of primary sources is 
quite large, consisting of thousands of words. Choosing automated coding allows to 
shift the workload from mechanical labor to the analysis of the results, which is an 
integral goal of this study. Additionally, automated coding allows us to compare the 
results of this study to others that have used the same coding scheme. While hand 
coding is still in use, the majority of the VICS-using Operational Code analysis is 
currently conducted with automated coding. Comparing results to these other studies 
may be useful.
2.2.4 Primary Source Material
Primary sources for VICS are Vladimir Putin's public speeches from a roughly six 
59 Schafer, Mark – Walker, Stephen G., 39-42.
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month period starting from Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and ending 
with the aftermath of First Minsk Accords in October 2014. Only speeches containing 
foreign policy material related to Ukrainian crisis will be used by VICS. They will be 
retrieved from the web page of the presidential administration (kremlin.ru). The time 
frame was chosen, because it corresponds to the start of deep Russian involvement in 
the Ukrainian crisis and its first, albeit temporary conclusion. It is also large enough to 
provide substantial amount of source material, increasing the accuracy of VICS results. 
Additionally, it also allows us to start and end VICS analysis with two major speeches 
concerning Russian foreign policy: Putin's address to Duma, before the formal 
annexation of Crimea and Putin's closing speech in the Valdai Discussion Club in 
October 2014. Every speech between these two will also be included, no matter how 
small. More individual speeches and more coded lines will reduce the possibility of 
individual speeches having extreme effects on the results.
The pool of primary sources will be divided into three Phases, which will be 
analyzed separately and then compared with each other. In this way, we can discover if 
Putin's Operational Code changed throughout the crisis. Phases will be roughly of equal 
length, and the division line will be based on an event that might hypothetically induce 
changes in Russian tactics. Phase 1 begins with Putin's speech to Duma on March 
regarding Crimea. Phase 2 will start in July 2014 in the aftermath of Malaysia Airlines 
Flight 17, which led to a new package of Western Sanctions and increased political 
pressure on Russia. It will end with the signing of First Minsk Accords in Early 
September, which starts Phase 3. This division allows us to observe both the effects of 
increased pressure as well as the easing of tension after first ceasefire agreement.
Limiting the analysis to three Phases will also ensure that each Phase has 
enough source material for reliable VICS scores. A fourth Phase might have been 
reasonable to add, based on the start of the Donbass conflict in May 2014. However, 
this would have split Phase 1 into two, leading to scarcity issues with source material. 
The other option would be to calculate a single Operational Code for the whole crisis, 
but this would leave all belief changes unrevealed. On the other hand, focusing on 
individual speeches would leave out a large amount of data from smaller speeches, as 
separately many of them would not have enough coded verbs to provide complete and 
reliable VICS indices. Walker and Schafer have generally discarded speech acts with 
less than 15 coded verbs. However, they have combined smaller speech acts together, if 
their dates are close to each other. Walker and Schafer suggest that the time frames for 
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Phase length may vary. They conclude that it is more important to ensure that the 
aggregation of speeches serves the purpose of the research design and, most 
importantly, that individual phases are not too small.60 This is a somewhat contested 
methodological choice. Renshon argues that single longer speech acts, with the 
minimum requirement of 1,500 words should be used for research on belief change, 
because it cannot be ruled out that changes happen between each aggregated speech 
act.61 This thesis attempts to resolve the issue by placing cutoff points for each Phase in 
places, where greatest belief changes hypothetically might happen. The choice of three 
Phases should provide an acceptable answer to these questions, as it allows VICS 
indices of Phase 2, where most of the small speeches are located, to be calculated in a 
satisfactory manner.
Division into Phases is a common, if not ever-present, characteristic of 
Operational Code analysis. Generally speaking, results have provided strong support for 
VICS as a tool to trace belief change. Renshon's research indicates that dramatic events 
can induce major changes in Operational Codes. He reports that the Operational Code 
of George W. Bush experienced statistically significant changes in one of the master 
beliefs after he had been elected as the president of the United States, and again after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.62 Similar results have been encountered in President Jimmy 
Carter's Operational Code after the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.63 Changes can be minor or major, likely depending on the 
severity of the event and the strength of the belief in question.
Official English translations will be used for VICS, as Russian language is not 
supported by the available Profiler Plus version. As VICS analysis is based on pronouns 
and sentence structures, very little will be lost in translation. Additionally, as Russian 
sentences sometimes lack verbs or a clear subject, VICS approach might be inaccurate 
if it was done on Russian language source material. Because the thesis is written in 
English, translated speeches will also be used throughout the study. Russian originals in 
this case, will be cross-checked to ensure that the translations match. Official 
translations typically tamper only with idioms and anecdotes in order to make them 
understandable to English speaking audiences. Changes in these areas are less likely to 
distort results, because they do not contain foreign policy content. For all intents and 
60 Schafer, Mark – Walker, Stephen G, 44.
61 Renshon 2008, 845.
62 Renshon 2008, 834.
63 Walker – Schafer – Young, 185-186.
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purposes, the translations are of high quality and are extremely reliable. Any worries 
that English translations might feature softer, or otherwise inaccurate, versions targeted 
at non-Russians are groundless, as shown in Chapter 3.
2.2.5 Prepared Statements and Spontaneous Comments as 
Source Material
The validity of at-a-distance analysis using leaders' prepared speeches has been called 
to question. Schafer points out that public speeches might be carefully crafted to appeal 
to the sensibilities of their intended audiences. In this case, Operational Code might 
analyze the public image of the leader instead of his or her beliefs. Of course, outright 
lies in public material cannot be ruled out beforehand either. However, this is not the 
only problem. As leaders may not always write their own speeches, the authorship of 
source material cannot be ascertained with perfect accuracy. While speechwriters 
typically will not write anything that goes against speaker's policy goals, it cannot be 
ruled out that prepared speeches might portray leaders' set of beliefs incorrectly.64 Some 
conflicting results have been found out in the last few decades. Generally speaking 
public speeches have been found useful in at-a-distance analysis. Renshon has 
discovered that Operational Code analysis on public speeches generally yields 
comparable results to analysis based on speeches held in private, indicating that they 
can deliver accurate depiction of the leader's beliefs. He also suggests that deception is 
a smaller problem than what was initially feared.65
Analyzing Operational Codes from speeches and interviews of American 
presidents Ronald Reagan and G.W. Bush, Brian Dille discovered major differences 
between the two sources. Both philosophical and instrumental indices exhibited 
changes, though not all VICS indices were affected. Generally speaking, both leaders 
had more conflictual strategies in an interview setting. Bush also exhibited a more 
conflictual outlook on the political world, and showed more pessimism regarding 
realization of his political goals. Dille attributes these differences to the effect of 
speechwriters, who in Reagan's case were able to capture his philosophical outlook 
64 Schafer, Mark, (2000): Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance. An  
Introduction to the Symposium. In Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No 3, 2000, 515.
65 Renshon, Jonathan (2009): When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational  
Codes at a Distance. In Political Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2009, 656.
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while failing at strategy. In Bush's case they failed at both. However, the context effects 
that are associated between prepared speeches and interviews may also be the source of 
some of the differences.66 Dille does not elaborate on this, however, but the fact that an 
interviewer, generally speaking, sets the theme of discussion should have effects on the 
content as well. The effect is especially significant on short questions with short 
answers, although they obviously also weigh the VICS score less than the long ones.
Schafer and Crichlow did a similar test on Bill Clinton's Operational Code, 
analyzing differences over time as well as between spontaneous and prepared remarks. 
The evidence is more damning that Dille's, as Operational Code variables in key traits 
with regards to both philosophy and strategy exhibited major differences between 
prepared and spontaneous remarks. While Schafer and Crichlow cannot explain the 
differences, they hypothesize that speechwriting process itself may be the cause of 
some of the differences, much like Dille did. They note that there may be more political 
value in presenting the leader in cooperative terms.67 Arguably, this explanation is not 
altogether satisfactory, as the leaders themselves should also understand the utility of 
being seen as the solution to conflicts instead of being their cause. 
Dille suggests that the difference between prepared and spontaneous speeches 
may be large enough to cause validity concerns, although he ends up suggesting that 
prepared speeches may be useful indicators of leaders' psychological characteristics, if 
they are involved in their creation.68 While we do not know the specifics of presidential 
speechwriting in Russia, an authoritarian ruler like Putin should be expected to have a 
high degree of control over the material. Schafer and Crichlow, on the other hand, 
suggest focusing on spontaneous remarks, as they seem to be more adept at capturing 
temporal changes that resulted in key events under analysis.69 In the light of these 
developments, Walker and Schafer suggest case by case approach when deciding 
whether to use spontaneous remarks or prepared speeches.They end up suggesting that 
the decision should be based on each individual research design.70
 In my opinion, none of these positions are conclusive enough to warrant 
unequivocal support. Therefore, this thesis analyzes both prepared and spontaneous 
66 Dille, Brian (2000): The Prepared and Spontaneous remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A 
Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurements. In Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2000, 
575-577.
67 Schafer, Mark – Crichlow, Scott (2000): Bill Clinton's Operational Code: Assessing Source Material  
Bias. In Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No 3, 2000, 560-562.
68 Dille, 582.
69 Schafer; Mark – Crichlow, Scott, 569-570.
70 Schafer, Mark – Walker, Stephen G, 47.
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statements separately in order to provide more data. Furthermore, the possibility of 
differences between spontaneous and prepared material is an interesting question in 
itself and may provide important insights on how Putin's set of beliefs manifest in 
different situations. If Putin's prepared and spontaneous remarks exhibit significant 
differences, that fact alone is valuable information. Fortunately, these tests are fairly 
easily run, as the material is readily available and analysis is automated. Both 
spontaneous and prepared Opcodes will be analyzed in three Phases, with the same 
qualifiers applying.71
2.2.6 The Criteria of Foreign Policy Content
VICS requires all source material's content to be dealing with foreign policy. The 
question is more complicated than one might realize. Speeches may consist of multiple 
parts dealing with a variety of issues. Majority of primary sources in this thesis are 
speeches like that. Only few of them are solely about the Ukrainian crisis. Especially 
interviews and longer speeches diverge constantly to address a multitude of issues. 
Walker et al. provide a working definition of foreign policy material as understood by 
VICS:
The criteria for foreign policy content include theend following: (1) the 
subject and object are international in scope; (2) the focus of interaction is a 
political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual, The 
self- and other-attributions are identified and coded as either positive (+) or 
negative (-) and then into categories from Verbs in Context System 
(VICS)."72
This definition is upheld in this thesis with a few adjustments. Because it attempts to 
analyze Putin's political strategy in the context of Ukrainian crisis, countries and actors 
71 The division between prepared and spontanenous comments is fairly clear. However, during one 
spontanous speech act, Putin started to read previously written notes. This part of the speech act is 
analyzed with other prepared statements. See The Kremlin (12 Sep 2014): Answers to journalists'  
questions. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46555>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
72 Walker – Schafer – Young, 182.
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that are not participants are edited out of primary sources before running them through 
Profiler Plus. If there is interest in discovering how Putin's Operational Code changed 
in the key moments of the crisis, it does not make sense to include speeches related to 
BRICS countries into the pool of primary sources. A similar choice of excluding certain 
themes was also carried out by Dille, who calculated VICS scores based on US–Soviet 
relations only, although in this case it was done, because presidential influence was 
most likely to be shown in that area.73 In any case, variations according to the demands 
of the research design are possible and commonly used.
Accordingly, when indices are calculated in this thesis, Self refers to Russia and 
Russia's in-groups. Other refers to Western countries, Ukraine and their in-groups, 
namely the actors that imposed or supported sanctions against Russia. Crimea and 
Separatists of the Donbass region are lumped with Other, as Putin clearly refers to them 
as such during the time of his speeches. The reasoning is that the philosophical 
Operational Code beliefs are conceptualized to be about the political universe that is not 
under subject's direct control. The uncertain status of the Separtists fits this criterion. 
The inclusion may affect the Opcode values slightly. However, I expect the effect to be 
fairly insignificant, as the vast majority of Other-references are about Western countries 
and Ukraine.
2.2.7 Editing Procedures of Primary Sources
No Operational code study that I have encountered has explicitly stated how its authors 
edited primary source material before running Profiler Plus. Editing is clearly necessary 
because only foreign policy content from speeches is intended to be analyzed. The 
program also provides a tool to ignore text. Because we are interested in Putin's Opcode 
as related to Ukrainian Crisis, some further measures needed to be taken. The downside 
is that the decision to remove content is up to the researcher, which may introduce some 
of the issues related to hand coding into automated analysis. The full list of actions that 
were done to primary sources is documented below:
73 Dille, 575.
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1. References to distant history are edited out. The reason is that past events are 
always coded by VICS as deeds, which would skew the analysis towards one 
extreme. Sometimes, this means cutting certain sentences out of paragraphs. The 
only exception to this rule is made when the actor from history, that Putin refers 
to, is meant to be acting at the time of the speech as well, or that historical 
action bears direct relevance to Ukrainian crisis. This features most prominently 
in speeches where forces behind the past color revolutions are stated by Putin to 
be acting in contemporary Ukraine.
2. Direct quotes of other people are edited out, as the statement is not Putin's own, 
and VICS cannot handle rhetorical nuances of that level.
3. Everything that does not directly concern foreign politicy related to Ukrainian 
crisis, is edited out. The most significant of these issues are economic ones, even 
if they concern international trade. If economic cooperation has clear and direct 
connection to foreign policy in the Ukrainian crisis, the statement may have 
been left intact, but this was decided on case by case basis. The Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and EU and issues with gas trade are such 
examples.
4. Statements that are more related to protocol than politics, even if they satisfy 
other conditions, were altogether not analyzed. They distort results, because 
their actual content is virtually the same every time. Certain press statements 
with typical exchange of pleasantries are such examples. They were also edited 
out of more substantial documents, if they were present.
5. Foreign policy content pertaining other nations besides participants in Ukrainian 
crisis is edited out, as it does not belong to the framework of this thesis. Mostly, 
this relates to Russia's bilateral relations with China, India and South American 
countries.
6. Pronouns and other Self-indicators that the computer program would identify as 
Other were changed to appropriate Self-indicators when they refer to Russians. 
Two examples are provided here: "Russia's Armed Forces never entered Crimea; 
they were there already in line with an international agreement." Russia's Armed 
Forces was changed to "we". "They" was also changed to "we". In another 
example, proper verbs were also inserted in the text: "Russia is an independent, 
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active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own 
national interests." In this case, "Russia is" was changed to "we are" and "it has" 
was changed to "we have". This is done purely to help the program to identify 
Self and Self's in-groups, when it should do so. If this had not been done, the 
Opcode indices would not give an accurate representation of Putin's Opcode, as 
those utterances would be interpreted by the program as Other. Coding process 
was unaffected, because transitive verbs were not tampered with.
7. Speeches were compiled into single files for each Phase, before they were 
analyzed by the program. For example, Prepared speeches in Phase 1 had their 
own file and spontaneous speeches in Phase 1 had their own file. Speeches in 
Phase 2 and 3 were compiled in the same manner.
2.3 Additional Qualitative Methods
Arrival of VICS and the automated coding software has transformed the field of 
Operational Code research. Problems of reliabilty, that were issues in Leites's research, 
have been eliminated by quantitative methods. However, the dominance of quantitative 
methods has introduced new problems. The Operational Code analysis typically does 
not explain or provide evidence of what the VICS indices really stand for. There is very 
little exposition on what a single numerical value tells us about leader's beliefs. 
Numerical value is can, of course, be put on a spectrum and the explained that it is 
extremely high, low or something in between, but the result is still fairly vague. A 
variant of this question was also noticed by B. Gregory Marfleet, who, when analyzing 
belief changes of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, noticed that public 
and private rhetoric may yield different VICS scores but might reveal similar trends. He 
ends up suggesting that individual VICS scores seem less important, and that changes in 
Opcode should be the focus of further analysis.74
While Marfleet's approach has also been embraced here, relatively minor 
attention that VICS pays to the analysis source material is still a problem that has to be 
dealt with. How beliefs verbally manifest themselves in source material is almost never 
74 Marfleet, B. Gregory (2000): The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuband Missile  
Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric. In Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2000, 
557.
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explored.  Instead of delving deeper, typical studies that employ automated Operational 
Code research stop short of conducting an in-depth analysis on the causes and effects of 
the newly discovered beliefs of world leaders. Considering the qualitative research 
tradition behind Operational code, this thesis suggests that more can and should be said 
of Putin's belief about the nature of the political universe (P-1) or the instrumental 
tactics he uses to deal with its consequences. To these questions VICS provides no 
answers. 
Therefore, qualitative content analysis will be employed to dissect and digest the 
results provided by quantitative methods. While Operational Code tends not to use 
mixed methods, methodological flexibility is not uncommon on other fields. Social and 
behavioral sciences have made great use for them. Using mixed methods has been one 
conclusion to paradigm wars fought between Positivism and Constructivism. The third 
position of pragmatism favors using methods that work for each particular case instead 
of being bogged down debates about the philosophy of science. Some researchers have 
also pointed out that there is inherent value in combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods, as there are enough similarities in their fundamental values.75 Social policy 
research has also accustomed into mixing both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Quantitative methods may include analyzing governmental statistics such as census 
data, smaller databases gathered by surveys, while qualitative methods may employ 
interviews or fieldwork, directly observing subjects.76 The concepts behind these 
methods translate well to Operational Code as well, even if the methods themselves are 
dissimilar. The greatest issue with mixing methods seems to be theoretical 
considerations, such as how data is treated, and some concerns resulting from multiple 
ontological positions.77 On the whole, advantages seem to outweigh disadvantages.
David L. Morgan makes a compelling case for methodological pragmatism and 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Philosophical issues aside, the 
choice of one tradition over the other can constrain research and limit the knowledge it 
can produce. Both quantitative and qualitative methodology have their own advantages 
and disadvantages in the research process. As Morgan points out, having absolute faith 
in one approach will only emphasize its problems, where it might otherwise be possible 
75 Tashakkori, Abbas – Teddlie, Charles (2008): Introduction to Mixed Method and Mixed Model Studies  
in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. In Plano Clark, Vicki L – Creswell, John W, (eds): The Mixed 
Methods Reader. Sage Publications, Inc, Los Angeles, 9-17.
76 Brannen, Julia (1992): Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview. In Brannen, 
Julia (ed.): Mixing Methods: qualitative and quantitative research. Avebury, Aldershot, 10-17.
77 Brannen, Julia, 4-10.
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to work on its issues by combingin methods.78 In the context of Operational Code 
analysis, the sole focus on qualitative methods has had a distinct problem with 
generalizability and lack of focus. On the other hand, VICS scores can be severely 
under-analyzed.VICS is certainly a turning point in Operational Code analysis, but I 
will consider it necessary to supplement it by analyzing the primary sources more 
deeply. 
The variety of options in combining the methods is substantial. One method can 
be emphasized over the other, or they can both be given equal weight.79 This thesis will 
privilege VICS scores as the best representation of Putin's Operational Code. However, 
it will attempt to expand and explain the results, and shed light on Putin's 
politicalstrategy in Ukraine by interpreting the content of his speeches. No 
commitments to any specific methods will be made, as the VICS results and the 
research tradition of Operational Code will provide sufficient guidance. While multiple 
methods have their uses, their contrived adoption would not bring intrinsic value to this 
study. It remains committed to pragmatism established by Alexander George and uses a 
mixed method in the benefit of the research design, not as an end in itself. It is my 
belief, that this kind of focus will only work in favor of the research design.
2.4 On Predictive Powers of Operational Code
Few scholars in the field of International Relations can resist the opportunity to make 
predictions on the future behavior of states. This seems to have been one of the goals of 
Realist school starting from Morgenthau. However, in effect, these goals have been 
tempered by reality. Mearsheimer suggests that prediction of future based on 
extrapolation of the contemporary will not provide sound results.80 Many Realists 
however, at least claim to understand the nature of the system and detect patterns of 
behavior and general trends. If the theory is accepted as the best possible explanation 
for the nature of international system, their claim should be treated as plausible. The 
same train of thought seems to operate on many other IR theories as well. On the other 
hand, one of the goals of Operational Code analysis has been said to be to provide 
78 Morgan, David L (2008): Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained. Methodological Implications of  
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. In Plano Clark, Vicki L – Creswell, John W (eds): 
The Mixed Methods Reader. Sage Publications, Inc, Los Angeles, 57-61.
79 Tashakkori, Abbas – Teddlie, Charles, 17-23; Brannen, Julia 1992, 24-30
80 Measheimer, Xii.
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causal links between beliefs and political action.81 Therefore, the question of prediction 
and causality requires more careful consideration.
Most of the scholars who have utilized Operational Code lean towards 
Positivism when they interpret their results. The results are rarely subject to in-depth 
scrutiny, after they have arrived. This is mainly a feature of studies, which use VICS as 
the predominant method. The results are typically presented in the form of a chart, 
which is then described in writing.
Naturally, when a method such as this has a strong Positivistic air about it, 
predictions on future behavior often follow. He and Feng, in fact, spell out their goal of 
predicting future Chinese foreign policy based on the results of Operational Code 
analysis of Xi Jinping.82 However, in practice they end up treating their results as 
indicative instead of definitive, and vary in making strong predictions about the future 
behavior of China. Concerning research on ideas in general, Goldstein and Keohane 
have warned against supposing causality between beliefs and actions of research 
subjects. The burden of proof is simply too great. However, they do argue that 
knowledge of ideas can work as a road map, when scholars attempt to find causal links. 
In this sense, when combined with the understanding of material factors, policy 
outcomes can be more readily explained.83 I believe that this is the most we can expect 
from any kind of micro-level foreign policy analysis, not to mention systemic 
approaches. It is entirely reasonable to expect that beliefs matter, and that they may 
even predispose a person to pursue a certain policies. However, it would be misguided 
to hope that research could provide a definite proof that a belief caused an action.
As far Operational Code analysis is concerned, the matter is further complicated 
by some studies that have discovered, that beliefs of their subjects have changed 
significantly over time. Sometimes the changes happened within months, as Schafer 
and Crichlow discovered with Bill Clinton during the Balkan crisis of 1993. These 
results suggest that long-term predictions have even less explanatory power than 
expected, although not all changes in Clinton's Operational Code seem to have been 
fundamental in nature.84 Therefore, general trends in beliefs can probably still be 
observed fairly reliably. Some beliefs may be more resistant to change than others. 
81 Mintz – DeRouen, 102.
82 He – Feng, 217.
83 Goldstein – Keohane, 11-13.
84 Schafer, Mark – Crichlow Scott, 566-570.
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However, any one Operational Code can by no means be treated as stable without 
further considerations. Accordingly, this thesis is more interested in congruence, than 
attesting definite causal links between Putin's beliefs and Russian strategy.
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3 The Operational Code of Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin's Operational Code Based on Spontaneous Comments in the Ukrainian Crisis
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
18.3 – 17.7.14 17.7 – 5.9.14 5.9 – 24.10.14
Philosophical Beliefs
P-1. Nature of Political Universe 0,32 0,39 0,29
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political Values 0,13 0,10 0,13
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Predictability of  Politics 0,11 0,17 0,10
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Development 0,29 0,41 0,26
(Low  Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance 0,97 0,93 0,97
(Small Role/Large Role)
Instrumental Beliefs
I-1. Strategic Approach to Politics 0,60 0,50 0,49
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of  Tactics 0,29 0,19 0,26
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-3 Risk Orientation 0,19 0,32 0,20
(Averse/Acceptant)
I-4 Timing of Action
a. Cooperation/Conflict 0,40 0,50 0,51
b. Words/Deeds 0,43 0,12 0,41
I-5 Utility of Means
   Rew ard 0,15 0,06 0,17
   Promise 0,13 0,06 0,06
   Appeal 0,52 0,62 0,52
   Oppose 0,09 0,12 0,16
   Threaten 0,05 0,12 0,06
   Punish 0,06 0,00 0,03
Vladimir Putin's Operational Code Based on Prepared Statements in the Ukrainian Crisis
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
18.3 – 17.7.14 17.7 – 5.9.14 5.9 – 24.10.14
Philosophical Beliefs
P-1. Nature of Political Universe 0,21 0,09 0,31
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political Values 0,03 -0,02 0,13
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Predictability of  Politics 0,10 0,07 0,11
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Development 0,29 0,24 0,25
(Low  Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance 0,97 0,98 0,97
(Small Role/Large Role)
Instrumental Beliefs
I-1. Strategic Approach to Politics 0,51 0,88 0,54
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of  Tactics 0,11 0,57 0,21
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-3 Risk Orientation 0,36 0,24 0,25
(Averse/Acceptant)
I-4 Timing of Action
a. Cooperation/Conflict 0,49 0,12 0,46
b. Words/Deeds 0,43 0,71 0,56
I-5 Utility of Means
   Rew ard 0,07 0,35 0,15
   Promise 0,03 0,12 0,05
   Appeal 0,66 0,47 0,56
   Oppose 0,07 0,06 0,10
   Threaten 0,03 0,00 0,00
   Punish 0,15 0,00 0,13
Table I.
Table II.
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3.1 Statistical Results
Test results indicate that Vladimir Putin's operational code against Western world 
experienced significant changes during the summer of 2014. Results are presented in 
two tables: Opcode changes in spontaneous comments are tracked by Table I, and 
changes in prepared statements are tracked by Table II. Prepared statements reveal a 
major reorientation of Putin's strategic beliefs during Phase 2, between plane crash of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on 17.7.2014 and first Minsk Accords ceasefire agreement 
in 5.9.2014. Putin's strategic inclination is strongly cooperative in all indices (I-1), but 
in Phase 2 it became extremely more so, both in terms of general direction and intensity 
(I-2). It is noteworthy that Putin's choice of tactic was throughout the entire crisis 
Appeals (+1). However, Phase 2 shows a substantial increase in Reward (I-5), 
indicating that, during this time, more tangible contributions became a far more 
important component of strategy, even rivaling Appeals in importance. The adoption of 
this secondary tactic was the cause of more intense cooperative direction, as Promises 
(+2) of future rewards were never favored by Putin. It is noteworthy, that while Putin is 
generally prepared to mix his tactics, he became even more ready to act both in words 
and deeds (I-4b). Operational code construct allows us to look at this score from the 
point of view of risk management behavior, where the actor balances between not doing 
enough and doing too much. It seems that something during Phase 2 induced a need to 
take firm action even at the risk of causing potential costs. Risk seems to have been 
managed by reducing conflictual statements and actions (I-4a) to a bare minimum. The 
conscious risk management is also supported by changed I-3 value, which reveals 
generally a more risk averse strategy in this Phase (I-3), a condition which persisted 
even after the First Minsk accords. Most likely, deeds in Phase 3 were not deemed risky 
at all, especially considering that they were solely cooperative ones (Reward +3).
Philosophical beliefs remained more stable, although it is noteworthy that Phase 
2 saw Putin's belief about the nature of political universe moving towards a more 
conflictual direction (P-1), to the point of feeling that it is certainly ambivalent instead 
of harmonious. Other values also became more negative, although not extremely so. 
The changes are not significant enough to conclude that Putin's beliefs in these areas 
changed much, if at all. However, as an indicator of a master belief, the fact that P-1 
value carries great importance in the Philosophical part of the Opcode should be 
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remembered and appreciated. Therefore, it cannot be said that prepared statements 
revealed a world view that was relatively unaffected by the crisis. Especially 
noteworthy is that the decrease of P-1 value in Phase 2 proved out to be a short slump, 
and Putin's belief recovered after First Minsk Accords ceasefire agreement. This was 
also accompanied by slightly strengthened belief in the realization of Russian goals (P-
2), a reasonable change, considering the continued existence of Separatist areas after the 
fact.
Putin's spontaneous statements did not experience drastic changes in Phase 2. 
On the whole his philosophical outlook became more positive. Especially noteworthy 
are the increased belief in the cooperative nature of politics (P-1) and the two scores 
that indicate a heightened belief in the predictability of the crisis (P-3) and the control 
of its development (P-4). These values speak of a man, who wants at least to give out an 
appearance of being in control. This notion is supported by certain instrumental values. 
As far as interviews are concerned, Putin was all talk and little action (I-4b). In a 
complete reversal of his prepared statements, he was also ready to employ both 
cooperative and conflictual rhetoric (I-4a) in equal measure. This may been seen as 
risky, but it was a risk he was increasingly willing to take (I-3). Punish (-3) was not part 
of his repertoire of tactics, so the risk may not have been as great as some might 
imagine.
While Putin's generally cooperative stance towards foreign policy may come as 
a surprise to many, in the context of Operational Code analysis it is not unusual. In fact, 
results from Putin's Opcode bear great resemblance to George W. Bush's Operational 
Codes throughout his presidency, which also had a cooperative streak despite the fact 
that United States was at war during most of his two terms. In fact, most of their values 
match closely, including the belief in the high role of chance (P-5), which is perhaps not 
as unsual, as it might seem at first glance.85
3.2 Cognitive Consistency and Putin's Operational Code
The fact that it were Putin's instrumental beliefs that experienced greatest changes is 
extremely interesting. Renshon reports that many social psychological studies on belief 
85 Renshon 2008, 829-834.
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change posit that beliefs are hierarchically organized. According to cognitive consitency 
theory, currently prevalent in political psychology, beliefs are relatively stable and 
mutually reinforcing. According to this view, new events are typically filtered and 
interpreted by people in a way that is consistent with their previously adopted world 
views. For this reason, beliefs most resistant to change lie on top of the hierarchy of 
beliefs and deal with the most fundamental assumptions about the world we live in. As 
far as leaders and Operational Code are concerned, these beliefs concern the nature of 
political reality and similar issues. Below them in the hierarchy are strategic policy 
beliefs and at the bottom are beliefs related to tactics, which are the most malleable 
ones. According to cognitive consistency theory, changes in beliefs happen from bottom 
up, so that fundamental assumptions rarely change without minor ones doing so as 
well.86 Furthermore, basic goals or objectives are so resistant to change that will only be 
changed after "repeated strategic failures".87 This assumption should be kept in mind, as 
it corresponds to shifts in Vladimir Putin's operational code during the Ukrainian Crisis. 
Beliefs referring to tactics, such as the greatly increased value for Reward (I-5a) during 
Phase 2, experienced largest changes in indices generated from prepared statements, 
while most of the fundamental assumptions about political world experienced fairly 
minor ones. The one exception is the master belief on the nature political reality (P-1), 
that had the corresponding score lowered. It seems reasonable to expect that new tactics 
would reflect this change. However, the matter is not as simple as it seems.
Renshon explains that the opposite is true for majority of Opcode studies. They 
indicate that philosophical beliefs change far more easily and in greater magnitudes 
than instrumental ones. When instrumental beliefs change with them, they usually do so 
in a more limited manner. According to Renshon, this behavior appears to directly 
contradict predictions of cognitive consistency theory. Putin's Opcodes throughout the 
period of analysis, on the other hand, developed markedly differently from the majority 
of other studies that Renshon refers to. Renson, however, points out, that only a small 
number of Opcode studies have been designed to detect alternative causes for belief 
changes. He concedes that while we know that Operational Codes change, it is still very 
unclear how they do so.88
Renshon manages to reconcile some of his findings with the cognitive 
consistency theory with the fact that the distinction between philosophical and 
86 Renshon 2008, 823-828.
87 Levy, 311.
88 Renshon 2008, 823-828.
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instrumental beliefs in the Operational Code construct is not meant to represent a 
hierarchy. While certain beliefs such as favorable disposition towards a certain tactical 
choice rank hierarchically below the master belief, instrumental values on the whole are 
not less important than the philosophical ones. Operational Code construct is designed 
to divide an individual's beliefs about Other into philosophical realm and beliefs of the 
proper course of action for Self into instrumental realm. Renshon concludes that 
instrumental beliefs can be seen to compromise a part of individual's personal identity, 
while the philosophical ones represent an interpretation of the political universe.89
3.3 Prepared Statements Revealing Tactical Choices
In this sense, minor changes in instrumental realm do not represent serious problem to 
Operational Code analysis. However, the rather unique pattern of instrumental scores in 
Putin's Opcode still has to be accounted for, as the findings run contrary to many other 
studies, including Renshon's, which discovered that 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA 
resulted in significant changes in George W. Bush's philosophical Opcode scores but 
had much less effect on his instrumental VICS scores90. Furthermore, it seems 
reasonable to contest Renshon's conclusion that instrumental beliefs truly go as deep as 
to represent parts of identity, at least as far as Putin is concerned, especially since the 
difference between his prepared statements and press interviews is massive during 
Phase 2. While the question of authorship of prepared statements is not completely 
resolved, it seems clear that Putin would stand behind them fully in critical moments 
such as the summer of 2014.
3.4 Tactical Functions of Prepared Statements and Interviews
I argue that major shift in all of Putin's instrumental scores in prepared statements may 
reflect a certain kind of tactical thinking with regards to short-term foreign policy goals. 
Many Operational Code studies have analyzed differences between prepared statements 
and spontaneous remarks. However, often the goal has been to find out that which kind 
89 Renshon 2008, 840-841.
90 Renshon 2008, 834.
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of source material is more reliable indicator of leader's psychology.91 The approach is 
slightly different here. In fact, based on Putin's scores, I argue that both can be reliable 
measures of his political strategy, but they may illustrate different aspects of it. It seems 
reasonable to believe that foreign policy can be approached from different angles in 
different mediums. Prepared statements are typically meant to reflect the official 
foreign policy stance of a country. They may be short or long but they are planned 
beforehand to disseminate information  about the country's plans for the future. In this 
way, they are extremely serious documents and require very careful preparation. In the 
case of this study, prepared speeches were usually held in an event that received major 
international coverage and reactions from all over the world, one such example being 
the speech held before the State Duma before it formally annexed Crimea.
 Phase 2, where major changes in Putin's Opcode happened, did not include 
prepared statements of this caliber. However, it did include a speech to the Security 
Council, a one that was clearly intended for a larger audience92, as well an address to 
separatists in Eastern Ukraine, where they were urged to open up a humanitarian 
corridor for entrapped Ukrainian soldiers. Putin also took this opportunity to address 
Ukrainian authorities and call for a ceasefire and further negotiations.93 While not as 
long in content as other material, especially the latter statement must have been 
extremely carefully composed in order to communicate the Russian message as clearly 
as possible.
Interviews, on the other hand, fulfill arguably a different function, a one that has 
fewer immediate foreign policy consequences. They are discussions on the previously 
announced foreign policy stances and elaborate on them. This pattern exhibits itself 
very well on the primary sources of this thesis. All spontaneous remarks in this paper 
were gathered either from one-on-one in depth interviews or from Putin's answers to 
questions during press meetings. While Ukrainian crisis was constantly under 
discussion, Putin did not introduce new policies in any of the interviews or made 
concise new openings. Instead, he emphasized his viewpoints, drew attention to facts 
that he thought were important and, generally speaking, defended his policy choices. In 
this sense, Putin's spontaneous Operational Code in Phase 2 may have been the result of 
91 See, for example, Schafer, Mark – Crichlow Scott; Dille.
92 The Kremlin (22 Jul 2014): Security Council meeting. In the official internet resources of the 
President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46305>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
93 The Kremlin (29 Aug 2014): President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed Novorossiya militia. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46506>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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a conscious tactical choice. Being seen as tough, confident and in control may have 
been useful at this point of the crisis. Acting such way is also less risky, if we consider 
that prepared statements were the real crux of this Phase, as far as political decisions 
were considered. Putin clearly relishes interview situations and has an uncanny ability 
to control their flow and the nature of discussion. His conduct in Phase 1 is an excellent 
indicator of this proactive approach to press meetings. At times he ignored the question 
almost entirely and gave a lengthy speech to get across a point that he thought was 
important.
In one prominent case during St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 
Putin was asked a three-part question by an Indian journalist, the first part concerning 
Putin's reaction to the fact the Indian Prime Minister did not support Western sanction 
policy against Russia. The other two parts dealt with bilateral relations and a nuclear 
power plant project with India. Putin's answer was a lengthy monologue on the 
background of Russian involvement in Ukrainian crisis, and how Russia was justified to 
act how it did. Putin pointed out that, with new authorities in place, Ukraine might join 
NATO, which might lead to a serious geopolitical threat to Russia and would force 
Russia out of Black Sea territory. He also stressed that new authorities were placed in 
power by an unconstitutional coup, while hinting that the coup was started by people 
who wanted to see Ukrainian NATO accession to happen. Finally, he expressed 
dissatisfaction that EU had refused to hear Russian concerns about negative economic 
impacts that the Ukrainian Association Agreement would have for them. It was a fine 
answer to a question that was not asked. The original question was only aknowledged at 
the end with few grateful words for the fact that India had stayed out of the crisis and 
had not introduced any sanctions. Regarding the nuclear power project, he simply gave 
a vague reply that Russia will uphold all agreements with India and hopes to increase 
cooperation in the future.94
In the same press meeting, a German journalist also asked whether Russia can 
be a reliable gas provider to Europe in the future due to its large new contract with 
China, while coyly mentioning its recent political course as another concern to Europe. 
Putin's reply was sufficiently detailed, but it also led him to an even more thorough 
examination on the history of Russian-Ukrainian gas trade, where, according to Putin, 
Russia had been accommodating Ukraine with various measures and discounts for 
94 The Kremlin (24 May 2014): Meeting with heads of leading international news agencies. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21090>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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years, until it simply could not continue to do so. Most of the answer was again 
unrelated to the question. While Ukraine's position as a transit country for Russian gas 
sold to Western Europe may warrant its mention in the answer, the amount of attention 
devoted to Ukraine here is in some ways almost excessive. The original question was 
not about the background of price hike for gas that Ukraine buys, but the answer was.95 
The focus on Ukraine, even when the situation did not specifically call for it, 
indicates that Putin approached at least this interview with certain objects in mind. 
Before the Indian journalist had the chance to ask his question some of his colleaques 
had already broached the subject of the Ukrainian Crisis by asking, whether Putin 
recognizes Petro Poroshenko as the legitimate president of Ukraine or not.96 Of course, 
Putin himself had also brought up the disputes in Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. 
However, these two cases only concerned certain aspects of the crisis and not really the 
crisis itself. It seems that Putin was expecting a question that would allow him to 
explain his point of view and justify for the acquisition of Crimea in the process. When 
a question that could naturally lead to an answer like that was never asked, he may have 
simply decided to take the chance as it came. In this case, the press meeting was used to 
restate and emphasize earlier points that were already present in the speech that Putin 
held before Russian parliament at the beginning of Phase 1. Therefore, it should not 
come as surprise that Opcode values between the prepared statements and the 
spontaneous ones did not diverge greatly in Phase 1.
3.5 New Tactics in Phase 2 – The Statistical Basis
The situation is markedly different in Phase 2, when Russian position with regards to 
Ukrainian crisis had become more perilous and uncertain. The plane crash of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17 had led Western countries to introduce a serious packet of sanctions 
against Russia for the first time, while the military forces of Ukrainian central 
government were advancing in areas previously held by the separatists. Before First 
Minsk Accords led to a ceasefire, the Ukrainian army had reached the outskirts of 
Luhansk and Donetsk. 
Correspondingly, the tone of Putin's statements became less hostile in Phase 2. 
However, this manifested differently in Opcode values derived from prepared 
95 The Kremlin 24 May 2014.
96 He did recognize Poroshenko.
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statements and interviews. The interviews in Phase 2 did not reveal as drastic changes 
in the instrumental realm as the prepared statements did. In fact, his direction of 
strategy actually became slightly less cooperative (I-1) and the intensity of tactics also 
lessened (I-2). Analysis based on his spontaneous remarks indicates, that he actually 
became less inclined to use Reward (I-5a), or Promise (I-5b), the two most cooperative 
tactics in the spectrum. He still favored a mix of cooperative and conflictual actions (I-
4a) but his propensity for action (I-4b) lessened significantly. He did become more risk 
oriented (I-3) though, but still remained somewhat risk averse on the whole. Putin's 
philosophical score on nature of political universe (P-1) actually became slightly higher, 
indicating a belief a significantly more harmonious world than the score derived from 
interviews did. His belief in the prospect of realizing values (P-2) decreased slightly 
more based on prepared statements than it did based on interviews, though. It should be 
added, that the sample size for spontanous comments in Phase 2 is very small, with only 
1,188 words out typical standard of 1,500 words. This may have had a slight impact on 
the results. While not an ideal situation, it simply has to be accepted in this case. In any 
case, the most significant results are related to Putin's prepared statements, and the data 
in every Phase of that category exceeded the threshold of the recommended word count.
Opcode scores in this area experienced a major upheaval in Phase 2, especially 
in the instrumental realm. The direction of Putin's strategy became extremely 
cooperative (I-1) to the point that only one negative Self-indicator was registered by the 
program in this Phase 2. This cooperative tactical streak also intensified greatly (I-2), 
which was caused by his greater readiness for cooperative deeds (Reward +3). This was 
the only high Reward value in all three Phases both in prepared and spontaneous 
statements, as the other ones were dominated by Putin's favorite tactic, Appeal (+1), 
which remained a favorite of Putin in this phase as well. Especially noteworthy is that 
the intensification of Putin's cooperative strategy was not caused by Promise (+2), 
another verbal tactic, but actual deeds, signified by Reward (+3). While it may be 
contested that Russia truly worked to solve the crisis with cooperative actions at this 
point, Putin certainly tried to demonstrate Russia's stance that it was not a hostile player 
in the crisis. This tactic and the changes presented above can also be seen in two 
Opcode scores that track certain kinds of risk management. Generally speaking, he 
became more risk averse (I-3) in a stark contrast to his persona in Phase 2 interviews. 
However, the two tactics signifying the timing of cooperative and conflictual actions (I-
4a) and words and deeds (I-4b) show that Putin had minimized conflictual actions in his 
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repertoire and that he was prepared to  employ heterogeneous tactics to drive forward 
his cooperative strategy. In terms of risk management, Putin had begun to see the 
mixing of cooperative and conflictual messages too risky for the situation, but on the 
other hand was prepared to risk doing too much instead of doing too little. This was a 
time of action, not of mere talk.
Putin's philosophical Opcode scores can give us some insight on why these 
changes had come to pass. His P-1 score, while not negative, decreased during Phase 2 
and registered the lowest value out all three phases. Additionally, his belief in the 
prospect of realizing values (P-2) also decreased as well as his belief that he could 
control the situation (P-4), or predict what is to come (P-3). However, the new values, 
other than P-1 were not far removed from Phase 1 ones, so it may be best not to draw 
too many conclusions about them. Altogether, however, it seems that Putin saw the 
position of Russia and the separatists as more precarious during Phase 2, a belief that 
would be congruent with the developments of the crisis at that time. The conflict in 
Ukraine had intensified into an open war and new Western sanctions posed a serious 
risk to Russian economy. It should be noted, that while Phase 1 interviews indicate that 
Putin's P-1 value rose to a friendly view, it may have been just an indicator of wishful 
thinking. Table III, where both prepared and spontaneous statements are combined into 
a general Opcode, shows that his general P-1 value, in fact, decreased between Phase 1 
and 2.
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Vladimir Putin's Combined Operational Code in the Ukrainian Crisis
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
18.3 – 17.7.14 17.7 – 5.9.14 5.9 – 24.10.14
Philosophical Beliefs
P-1. Nature of Political Universe 0,28 0,18 0,26
(Conf lict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of  Political Values 0,09 0,03 0,09
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Predictability of Politics 0,10 0,07 0,10
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Development 0,29 0,30 0,25
(Low  Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance 0,97 0,98 0,98
(Small Role/Large Role)
Instrumental Beliefs
I-1. Strategic Approach to Politics 0,57 0,70 0,51
(Conf lict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of  Tactics 0,23 0,38 0,24
(Conf lict/Cooperation)
I-3 Risk Orientation 0,24 0,24 0,21
(Averse/Acceptant)
I-4 Timing of Action
a. Cooperation/Conflict 0,43 0,30 0,49
b. Words/Deeds 0,42 0,42 0,46
I-5 Utility of Means
   Rew ard 0,12 0,21 0,17
   Promise 0,10 0,09 0,06
   Appeal 0,57 0,55 0,53
   Oppose 0,08 0,09 0,14
   Threaten 0,04 0,06 0,04
   Punish 0,09 0,00 0,06
Table III.
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4 Qualitative Analysis
4.1 Phase 1 Content Analysis – Dominance of Grand Strategy
The new strategy of Phase 2 can also be seen in the actual content of Phase 2 source 
material. While many of his Phase 1 statements can be readily interpreted as conflictual, 
Putin toned this side down and presented himself as far more cooperative in Phase 2. 
Variance is greater in Phase 1 statements, however, as the period is longer and contains 
more speech acts. Between the beginning and the end of it, the situation in Ukraine had 
also become very different.
Russia had already involved itself in the crisis in the beginning of Phase 1. 
Crimea had been occupied for weeks, and the parliament had approved the use of 
military force to safeguard Russian population in Ukraine. The EU and the United 
States had introduced their first, albeit minor, package of sanctions against Russia. 
Initially Russian involvement was limited to Crimea. First disturbances in the Donbass 
happened in the middle of April, after which Russian-backed Separatists took control of 
the region. Ukraine responded by launching a military operation against the Separatists, 
which led to an open war in the area. The operation was somewhat succesful during 
Phase 1, in the sense that the Ukrainian government managed to gain victories against 
the Separtist forces, capturing the city of Sloviansk in early July. Phase 1 ends in 
uncertainty, as Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crashes into the Separatist territory.
Putin's views in Phase 1 are best presented in Putin's address to State Duma 
Deputies, after which Russia formally voted in favor of annexing Crimea. This speech 
reveals deep dissatisfaction with the way international system has developed after the 
end of the Cold War. According to Putin, the collapse of bipolar system under the 
United States and Soviet Union has resulted in American domination of the world, 
which in turn has led to instability and the unilateral use of force in political disputes:
"Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what  
has  been happening in  the world over the past  several  decades.  After  the 
dissolution  of  bipolarity  on  the  planet,  we  no  longer  have  stability.  Key 
international  institutions  are  not  getting  any stronger;  on  the  contrary,  in 
many  cases,  they  are  sadly  degrading.  Our  western  partners,  led  by  the 
United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their 
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practical policies, but by the rule of the gun."97
Putin explains that the United States and the West use international law only 
when it suits their purposes, such as in Kosovan independence, while they 
routinely ignore it when it is convenient to their interests, as happened in 
Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. According to Putin, Russia was next 
under attack, as color revolutions in Ukraine and other countries were 
"'controlled'" by outside forces, while Russia had only wanted its interests to 
be taken seriously:
"We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were 
aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all 
this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the 
West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to 
strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. 
But we saw no reciprocal steps.
On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our 
backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s 
expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at 
our borders."98
This view makes it easier to understand why Putin consistently denied 
throughout the crisis that Russia is one party of the conflict in the Donbass 
region99 and why Russia does not, publicly at least, consider Ukraine to be 
its enemy. Putin is pushing a narrative of Western aggression against Russia, 
and Russian military operation in Ukraine would fit into it poorly. Putin also 
seems to consider Ukraine's new government an American proxy, and, as 
such, it does not represent the people of Ukraine to him100. This position 
becomes apparent in the context of other color revolutions as well, as he 
97 The Kremlin (18 Mar 2014): Address by President of the Russian Federation. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603>, 
retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
98 The Kremlin 18 Mar 2014.
99 The Kremlin (7 May 2014): Press statements and replies to journalists' questions. In the official 
internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20973>; The Kremlin (27 Aug 2014): Answers to  
journalist' questions following working visit to Belarus. In the official internet resources of the 
President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46495>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
100 The Kremlin 24 May 2014.
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insists that the peoples' feelings of discontent were "cynically" taken 
advantage of: Their misfortune may have been real, but it was only used to 
install new government that only worsened their situation and took the 
power off their hands.101 To Putin, the true battle extends far beyond 
Ukraine's borders. Nowhere does this stance become clearer than at the end 
of the address: 
"Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions 
but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I 
would like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth 
column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’, or are they hoping to put 
us  in  a  worsening  social  and  economic  situation so as  to  provoke public 
discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and clearly aggressive 
in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly. At the same time, we will  
never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, 
but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-
neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world."102
According to Putin, Russia may be under attack too. It is important to note, 
that it is not Russia's territorial integrity that is in danger, but its domestic 
stability. Indeed, no country could probably seriously threaten a country 
with Russia's military capabilities. He states as much himself in a meeting 
with Security Council during Phase 2, owing Russia's safety primarily to the 
balance of military forces in the world.103 However, the office of president is 
not as invulnerable as the nation is, as has been shown in color revolutions 
and in the Arab Spring. Putin seems to feel that his position may be under a 
similar threat. It would provide some explanation to the strong response 
Putin showed in the wake of the 2014  revolution in Ukraine. With slightly 
adapted outlook based on political realism, we can observe that while 
Russia's survival as a state is not threatened, the survival of Putin's 
presidency may be. The aggressive response should not come as a surprise. 
Putin's character has been previously been studied and some 
congruence between certain traits or "roles" and political action has been 
101  The Kremlin 18 Mar 2014.
102  The Kremlin 18 Mar 2014.
103  The Kremlin 22 Jul 2014
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found. Putin has been described as survivalist, always preparing for the 
worst.104 He has also emphasized the need for strength both in personal life 
and politics.105 Some parallels may be drawn between the Second Chechen 
War and the conflict in Ukraine. Putin's response was to stop the former 
decisively, swiftly and with overwhelming use of force, because he saw it as 
an existential threat to Russia.106 While Ukraine's position as an independent 
country makes it different from Chechnya, Putin clearly treats it separately 
from many of its other neighbors. Not only has he said that Russia will 
protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine, along with those Ukrainians who 
identify with Russia,107  Putin has gone on record saying that he considers 
Ukrainians and Russians one people.108 Many Ukrainians might disagree 
this view, but Putin may have had a good reason to adopt it. Cultural, 
linguistic and familial connections between the two countries are indeed 
strong. If Ukraine continues to follow the course towards closer economic 
and political integration with the European Union and gains the perks that 
come along with it, word of it will find a way to Russia, unfiltered by 
Russian state controlled media and news channels. It might have unforeseen 
effects on Russia's domestic politics, including Putin's own future.
4.2 Russia's Foreign Policy Orientation
Above statements in themselves present a deeply conflictual view of the 
world, a one that is dominated by Western aggression and dominance. It 
should be stressed that Putin's conflictual view of world politics was not 
borne out of Ukrainian revolution alone. The roots of it go at least as far 
back as to 2007, when he held a widely known speech in Munich, where he 
discussed world politics on similar terms. He voiced his opposition for 
104 Hill, Fiona – Gaddy, Clifford G. (2013): Mr. Putin. Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington D.C, 84.
105 Hill – Gaddy, 93-95.
106  Hill – Gaddy, 98.
107 The Kremlin (24 Jun 2014): Press statements and answers to journalists' questions following  
Russian-Austrian talks. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46060>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
108 The Kremlin (16 Apr 2015): Direct Line with Vladimir Putin. In the official internet resources of the 
President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49261>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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unipolar world, his concerns for eroding respect for international law and 
disruption of balance of power by new military infrastructure on Russia's 
borders. Putin was especially critical of NATO expansion in Eastern 
Europe, calling it a provocation. Putin also resisted the idea that Western 
organizations such as NATO and EU could unilaterally legitimize use of 
force, reserving the role for the United Nations only. Interestingly, the idea 
that the West is interfering with Russia's domestic affairs was already 
present here, in the form of NGOs that receive foreign funding. Taken 
together, all the building blocks of Putin's grievances with regards to 
Ukrainian Crisis were already present in 2007.109 
However, the confrontational approach has far deeper roots in 
Russian politics. The attitude that the West is constantly and covertly 
undermining Russia's international position and opposing its legitimate 
interests dates back to the late 1990s. During this time Russia suffered a loss 
of status and a number of humiliating defeats in the international arena. It 
was unable to reach many of its goals with regards to NATO expansion, 
arms treaties and in the Yugoslavian breakup. After the appointment of 
Yevgeniy Primakov as Russia's foreign minister, and with support of many 
Russian bureaucratic elites, Russia edged closer towards a new a 
confrontation with the West. At this point Russia adopted a new strategy, 
dubbed Primakov School by scholars, as the solution to Russia's lack of say 
in international affairs. It emphasized the concept of a multipolar world as 
opposed to a unipolar one led by the United States, and sought the status of 
one of the leading power centers for Russia. As an independent power 
center, it was thought that Russia could face American ambitions by forging 
strategic partnerships in Asia and Europe, while anticipating that the end of 
the Cold War would lead United States to lose its influence over many of its 
allies.110
In the early part of his presidency Putin had reversed this goal and 
had adopted a strategy based on cooperation on key issues, such as trade. 
109 The Kremlin (10 Feb 2007): Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on  
Security Policy. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>, retrieved 28.3.2016.
110  Fedorov, Yury, E. (2005): Russia's Foreign Policy: Basic Trends under President Putin. In Hanna 
Smith (ed.): Russia and Its Foreign Policy. Influences, Interests and Issues. Gummerus Printing, 
Saarijärvi, 10-14.
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Global terrorism was also a threat facing both the West and Russia. These 
common issues fostered a more cooperative vision of international politics. 
However, in the context of Ukrainian Crisis, these concerns and goals seem 
to be of little importance. Table IV by Yury Fedorov compares Primakov 
School with Putin's initial foreign policy orientation. As we can see, Putin's 
original vision is all but disappeared and his current foreign policy 
orientation seems to harken back to the principles of Primakov School.111 
The major exception seems to be the anticipation of NATO's disintegration 
and partnerships in Europe, which probably are not realistic goals today, 
although close relations with certain European Populist parties may be an 
adaptation of the old view. Eurasian integration may be used to provide a 
replacement.
111 Fedorov 14-17.
 Table IV. Russia's Foreign policy orientation in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
 The "Primakov School"  Vladimir Putin
 Conceptualization of Russia  A great power, one of the  A European Country and
 centers of the multipolar  equal member of the
 world.  Western community of
 nations.
 Basic world trend  Two antagonistic trends:  Internationalism and
 the formation of a "multi-  globalisation. Compe-
 polar world" and the U.S.  tition for markets and
 attempt to dominate  investment. A rise in
 global politics.  extremism and terrorism.
 Key threats to Russia  The formation of a "uni-  Terrorism, extremism,
 polar world". The Ameri-  WMD proliferation.
 can policy of global domi-  Transnational organzed
 nation.  crime.
 Russia's key strategic  A "Strategic Partnership"  A Strategic Partnership
 policies  with China, India and  with the United States,
 the "quickly integrating"  NATO and European
 Europe on an anti-American  Union; normal relations
 basis. Anticipation of the  with China.
 Disintegration of NATO.
Source: Fedorov, 17.
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4.3 Phase 2 Content Analysis – New Tactics but Old Strategy
Because of the longevity of this idea of conflict between Russia and the 
West, it should probably be thought as Putin's long-term outlook on the 
nature of contemporary international system. This long-term view was 
present in some of speeches in Phase 2 as well, but on the whole it took a 
backseat to more pressing issues. Phase 2 saw Ukrainian government 
continue its military operation in the Donbass region. The EU and the 
United States also became more involved, responding to the plane crash of 
Flight 17 by introducing package of sanctions, which targeted Russian 
economy. However, Phase 2 ended in a decisive victory for the Separatists, 
as a succesful counterattack led by Russia forced Ukranian military forces 
into a ceasefire.
Primary source material for was scarce in this period, and in fact 
only one speech, the one held to Security Council in 22.7.2014 was 
primarily about long-term strategy. While it is shorter, its approach is 
somewhat comparable to speech held to State Duma Deputies as it included 
remarks dealing with both international and domestic politics, as well as the 
economy and pressing matters of Ukrainian crisis. Here the message when it 
comes to world politics remains as it was in Phase 1:
"However, ever more frequently today we hear of ultimatums and sanctions. The very 
notion of state sovereignty is being washed out. Undesirable regimes, countries that 
conduct an independent policy or that simply stand in the way of somebody’s interests get 
destabilised. Tools used for this purpose are the so-called colour revolutions, or, in simple 
terms – takeovers instigated and financed from the outside."112
"At the same time, they present Russia with an ultimatum: either you let us destroy the part 
of the population that is ethnically, culturally and historically close to Russia, or we 
introduce sanctions against you. This is a strange logic, and absolutely unacceptable, of 
course."113
112 The Kremlin 22 Jul 2014.
113 The Kremlin 22 Jul 2014.
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"However, attempts are clearly being made to destabilize the social and economic situation, 
to weaken Russia in one way or another or to strike at our weaker spots, and they will 
continue primarily to make us more agreeable in resolving international issues."114
This view of Russia being under attack by Western countries is exactly the 
same as the one presented several months ago before the State Duma. The 
same themes of unnamed outside forces toppling governments and even 
another reference to color revolutions point out that this is Putin's long-term 
view, a one that he wants repeatedly to communicate both in Russia and 
abroad. It deserves to be pointed out though that other Phase 2 speeches, 
which espoused a noticeably more cooperative view on the crisis, were 
probably not dishonest in nature, in the sense that they were targeted at 
outside audiences with certain objectives in mind. The speech for the 
Security Council was held for international audiences as well, as Putin used 
this chance to express his condolences to the victims of Flight 17, as well as 
reached out to Kiev and asked them to introduce a ceasefire in order to 
investigate the plane crash.115
However, the Opcode scores for instrumental values in prepared 
statements indicate that something had changed in Russian approach. It 
should be stressed that Opcode values cannot really be explained by 
content, as they depend only on transitive verbs in the text. However, there 
was clearly another thread emerging from Putin's speeches, one that was 
topical instead of general, and usually abstained from commenting the state 
of world affairs. The two threads are different both in content and context. 
Putin's cooperative side is, practically speaking, only visible in the context 
of certain events of the Ukrainian Crisis, while his most conflictual 
statements are usually about world politics. The context of Ukrainian crisis 
gained prominence in Phase 2, and along with it came a more cooperative 
tone. In fact, practically all the other prepared speeches have Putin calling 
for the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the use of diplomatic means to 
move forward. This probably had greatest effect on results in Phase 2. Other 
114 The Kremlin 22 Jul 2014.
115 The Kremlin 22 Jul 2014.
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prepared statements in this period were a statement with regards to Flight 
17,  a public statement after meeting with Finnish President Niinistö, as well 
as an address to Separatists after their successful counterattack in the end of 
August. The final one of them is perhaps the most illustrative of Phase 2 
Opcode values, as it solely promotes peace in Russian good will and is even 
gracious to Ukrainian soldiers:
"I call on the militia groups to open a humanitarian corridor for Ukrainian service members 
who have been surrounded, so as to avoid any needless loss of life, giving them the 
opportunity to leave the combat area unimpeded and reunite with their families, to return 
them to their mothers, wives and children, and to quickly provide medical assistance to 
those who were injured in the course of the military operation.
For its part, the Russian side is ready and willing to provide humanitarian aid to the people 
of Donbass, who have been affected by this humanitarian catastrophe.
I once again call on the Ukrainian authorities to immediately stop military actions, cease 
fire, sit down at the negotiating table with Donbass representatives and resolve all the 
accumulated problems exclusively via peaceful means."116
It should be added, that in the same speech Putin claims that Ukrainian 
soldiers were not volunteering for the operation but were simply following 
orders.117 This is a clever way to draw the line between Ukrainian people 
and the contemporary Ukrainian government, which has consistently been 
Putin's goal since the annexation of Crimea. It shows that even smaller 
speeches concerning short-term objectives may have this long-term strategic 
component in them.
Even though Putin's long-term views on world politics remained 
unchanged, as it can be seen with regards to speech for the Security 
Council, the fact they took backseat to addresses to militia or calls for a 
ceasefire reveals a certain tactical choice: the focus had to be on Eastern 
Ukraine. A quick ceasefire to calm down the situation in the Donbass region 
was probably in Russia's interests. Most of the speeches in Phase 2 were 
116 The Kremlin (29 Aug 2014): President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed Novorossiya militia. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46506>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
117 The Kremlin 29 Aug 2014.
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held as the Separatist counter attack was already in progress. At this point, 
short-term objectives were most likely already decided, and cooperative 
rhetoric was employed to support them. Considering the backdrop of Flight 
17 and the increased Western pressure, these short-term goals were probably 
limited to ensuring the continued existence of Separtist Donbass118. While 
Putin acted defiantly in his opening remarks to Security Council, new 
Western sanctions posed a serious threat to Russian economy for the first 
time in the crisis.119
Sanctions most likely did not have a great effect on Russia's short-
term goals, as the counterattack started after they were implemented, but 
they did represent uncertainty and heightened risks involved with overt 
aggression. Consequently, a cooperative tone may have been a tactical 
choice to reduce risks involved in provoking the West in further action 
during the military operation. Russia never acted openly in Ukraine, and 
this was probably one of the reasons. Accordingly, cooperative words had 
most use during the height of the operation. The successful counterattack, 
which lasted only weeks, allowed Putin to stabilize the situation with a 
ceasefire, which removed an immediate threat of further political action 
against Russia. After that, there was no sense for the West to upgrade 
sanctions to a new level, while the short-term goal had been achieved.
Interestingly enough, during this time Putin also expressed 
satisfaction in a press meeting that Russia's concerns for the economic 
effects of Ukrainian Association agreement were for the first time taken 
seriously, in a stark contrast to Phase 1 views detailed above.120 The fact that 
this conciliatory tone had crept into interviews as well, points out to subtle 
shift in Russia short-term plans, even if instrumental Opcode values 
remained relatively stable. It is, however, somewhat reflective of Putin's 
heightened P-1 value.
4.4 Events Guiding the Themes of Public Speeches
118 The fact that the military operation resumed shortly after the ceasefire also supports this conclusion.
119 Sanctions in Phase 1 were mostly targeted at certain Russian and Crimean officials and individuals 
close to Putin.
120 The Kremlin 27 Aug 2014.
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There is another major explanation to differences in Opcode scores between 
first two Phases. Statements or interviews are not given in void, but are 
dependent on the international developments that transpired during Phase 2. 
Marfleet noticed something similar in Kennedy's VICS scores during Cuban 
Missiler Crisis, where I-1 and I-2 indices were noticeably more conflictual 
in private discussions than in public speeches throughout the crisis. He 
suggested that one reason for this disparity was the nature of discussions. In 
private, Kennedy had to prepare for the worst, and the discussions with his 
closest advisers were about contingency plans in the case that a peaceful 
solution could not be reached.121 In a similar manner, the nature of 
discussions changed in Phase 2, which was dominated by three factors. The 
first one was the plance crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The second 
one was the continuing Ukrainian military operation in the Donbass Region 
and the counterattack that repelled it. The final thread running through this 
phase was the political process towards ceasefire. Almost every speech in 
this phase dealt with these issues, which were either non-existent or of 
minor importance in Phase 1. Extremely conflictual statements in some of 
these cases would simply have been utterly counterproductive to Russian 
goals. Ceasefire negotiations are hard to start with an aggressive tone, and 
any constructive discussion on a military attack against civilians requires 
certain prudence.
 This most likely had an important effect on Phase 2 Opcode values. 
It can already be seen in Putin's first official word regarding the plane crash 
of Flight 17, where he carefully attempts to deflect any accusations that 
Russia might share a responsibility for the strike: "At the same time, no one 
should and no one has the right to use this tragedy to pursue their own 
political goals." On the other hand, he hints that Ukrainian government 
might be partly responsible without actually blaming them: "I believe that if 
military operations had not resumed in eastern Ukraine on June 28, this 
tragedy probably could have been avoided."122 The actual meaning behind 
these two statements resembles Putin's Phase 1 views, as he expects the 
121 Marfleet, 551.
122 The Kremlin (21 Jul 2014): Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46262>, 
retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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crash to have utility value for Russia's unnamed adversaries in the conflict. 
However, he expressed these views differently this time, perhaps for the 
reasons outlined above. Phase 1 speeches, on the other hand, concerned a 
number of different issues, the most important of them being Russia's place 
in the international system. This question is a long-term issue, and could be 
and was discussed with a more conflictual tone. 
In this way, events and agency are interconnected, and short-term 
tactical choices became more important to Putin than long-term strategy. 
They were simply more relevant at the time, and speeches too revolved 
around them accordingly. This also has an effect on Opcode scores, since 
there are only so many ways one can offer their condolences or call for a 
ceasefire. It should be noted, that a typical Operational Code analysis does 
not have to deal with this question. Many studies sample their source 
material from a large pool speeches over period of years, minimizing the 
effects from single important events.123 However, it should still be stressed 
that this turn of events did not disturb the statistical analysis in this thesis. In 
fact, one of the goals was to bring out the effects these events had for Putin's 
Operational Code. In these isolated cases as well, Opcode values deal with 
beliefs of proper course of action. It seems clear, that in terms of the tragedy 
of Flight 17, Putin believed that a very careful approach was needed, when 
it came to his own statements. Other avenues for Russian viewpoints, the 
media for example, approached the tragedy differently. The reasons vary, 
but they are probably related to Russian strategy as well. This issue, 
however, requires a study of a greater scope than what is attempted here.
4.5 Phase 3 – Return to Stability
Phase 3 begins with the signing of First Minsk Accords, which formally 
ended the hostilities in the Donbass region. It was a period of brief respite 
from the crisis, and ends a few weeks later in late October.  During this time 
Putin's speeches reverted back to concerning international relations, which 
allowed a more conflictual tone again. This change can most readily be seen 
123 See, for example, He – Feng; Malici – Malici.
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in Putin's Opcode scores based on prepared statements, which swung back 
towards Phase 1 values in multiple indices. The instrumental values 
experienced greatest changes, with the I-1 value reverting to 0,54, which is 
almost the same as 0,51 in Phase 1. Notably, this change was accompanied 
by shrinking of cooperative intensity (I-2), powered by lesser amount 
Promises (+2) and Rewards (+3) and propensity to usage of hostile tactics, 
especially Punish (-3). Putin's dominant tactic in Phase 3 was Appeal (+1) 
again, which indicates a certain lack of need to engage in serious 
compromises. Indeed, after a lull in Phase 2, Putin was ready to use both 
cooperative and conflictual tactics again (I-4a) in almost exactly the same 
propensity as in Phase 1. While Putin's risk orientation (I-3) remained in 
Phase 2 numbers, it should be noted that he reverted to Phase 1 numbers in 
his mix verbal tactics and deeds (I-4b), effectively meaning that he saw less 
use for deeds in Phase 3 than in Phase 2. Remarkably, after some changes in 
Phase 2, Putin's entire Philosophical Opcode has changed back almost 
exactly to Phase 1 numbers, with only minor differences across the board. 
Most notably, his P-1 value increased moderately when compared to Phase 
2, while still indicating mixed feelings about the nature of political universe.
The fact that Opcode values of Phases 1 and 3 are so similar points 
out to the conclusion that they represent a certain base line Operational 
Code for Vladimir Putin, when handling the Ukrainian Crisis and perhaps 
other situations in world politics as well. We should also recall, that 
Opcodes calculated from spontaneous remarks are very close to these values 
in multiple indices. For instance, both master beliefs I-1 and P-1 stay within 
a moderately small range that indicates that Putin's belief about world 
politics is slightly tinted towards a harmonious stance, and that his direction 
of strategy is definitely cooperative. His favored tactic in every index in all 
Phases is Appeal, so it is fairly safe to say, that it is a more or less 
permanent part of his tactical palette when Russia is challenged in the 
international arena. It is hard to say, whether or not his Operational Codes 
would also remain as they are here in a non-crisis environment. None of the 
speeches analyzed within these pages took place in the context of standard 
policy formation. The thesis also does not extend to events leading up to 
Second Minsk Accords, so it is hard to determine whether extremely 
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cooperative tactics in Phase 2 were a onetime application to a specific 
situation or a standard approach to support a diplomatic solution whenever 
the need arises. In these cases, further research is needed. However, new 
Opcode values in Phase 3 are a very strong indicator that Phase 2 values 
arose from a temporary of need rather than from a new alignment in foreign 
policy. If Western sanctions had any effect on Russian foreign policy, it was 
most likely a short-lived. I suspect that military operations in Eastern 
Ukraine had more effect on Putin's, at the time, more cooperative tactics.
In any case, short-term cooperative tactics of any kind gave a way to 
long-term strategy in Phase 3, analysis of which is mostly based on Putin's 
speech in the final plenary meeting of Valdai International Discussion Club 
released in 24.10.2014. This speech is mostly about the big picture of high 
politics in the contemporary international system. Putin connects the 
ongoing Ukrainian crisis to a wider process of deteriorating rule of law and 
mutual agreements in international relations. Besides increased rearmament, 
he sees the escalation of ethnic, social and religious conflicts as a threat to 
world peace. Here color revolutions are lumped together with other 
revolutions and military conflicts in other parts of the world, the prime 
cause of all being Western meddling:
"Incidentally, at the time, our colleagues tried to somehow manage these processes, use 
regional conflicts and design ‘colour revolutions’ to suit their interests, but the genie 
escaped the bottle. It looks like the controlled chaos theory fathers themselves do not know 
what to do with it; there is disarray in their ranks."124
The latter part of the quote does not seem to refer to Ukraine. Putin's 
message here is that Western elites are leading the world into chaos by 
supporting groups, of which they know nothing about. Without getting into 
specifics of each crisis Putin mentions the changing attitudes that Western 
media has for activists in the Middle East: first they are called freedom 
fighters, then Islamists. In this case Putin most likely refers to Egypt in the 
aftermath of Arab Spring or the situation in Syria, which were already 
124 The Kremlin (24 Oct 2014): Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. In the official 
internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46860>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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discussed in an earlier part of the speech. The important part, however, is 
that Putin seems to consider the latest revolution in Ukraine a part of the 
Western grand strategy of toppling disliked regimes or administrations all 
over the world. Unsurprisingly, First Minsk Accords did not seem to alter 
this view at all. With regards to cognitive consistency theory, this is 
probably to be expected. Putin's own strategy seems to be opposing this 
process, and one ceasefire agreement should not change it. In this sense, it is 
also no wonder that Putin's Opcode values reverted back to normal after 
immediate risks to Russia were settled. Cooperative tactics had outlived 
their usefulness.125
An argument could, of course, be made for the interpretation that 
Putin had reversed the cooperative stance of Phase 2, because it was starting 
to become clear that First Minsk Accords were not being implemented in a 
satisfactory manner. Putin, actually refers to these troubles in the press 
Q&A session after the speech. However, he did not adopt these views late in 
Phase 3. In fact, Putin had voiced his opinion that Ukraine was an American 
puppet only a week after the agreement:
"I can’t help but think the seditious thought that no one actually cares about 
Ukraine itself. They are just using Ukraine as an instrument to shake up 
international relations. Ukraine is being used as an instrument and has been 
made hostage to the desire of some players on the international stage to 
revive NATO say, not so much even as a military organisation, but as a key 
instrument in US foreign policy, in order for the US to consolidate its 
satellites and scare them with a threat from abroad. But if this is the case, this 
is a real shame because it means that Ukraine has essentially become hostage 
to another’s interests. I do not see anything good in this practice."126
In his defense it has to be said that this answer was a reaction to a question 
regarding new EU sanctions, which were announced before the press 
meeting. However, Putin brought up the United States himself, without any 
journalist specifically asking about the country. This speaks volumes of his 
125 The Kremlin 24 Oct 2014.
126 The Kremlin (12 Sep 2014): Answers to journalists' questions. In the official internet resources of the 
President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46612>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
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views on the nature of the crisis and the part that the EU has to play in it. It's 
not a particularly flattering assessment, and suggests that Putin considers 
the United States as Russia's primary Western counterpart, with European 
countries playing a lesser part. The role that he sees NATO playing out only 
reinforces this position.
It is also worth pointing out that in Phase 3 Putin no longer mentions 
the improved talks he had a month earlier with his Western colleagues 
regarding Russian economic concerns with the Ukraine's EU Association 
Agreement. In fact, he has completely reverted to these Phase 1 views that 
were expressed in May 2014:
"We had documented evidence to argue that they were wrong and that Ukraine was part of 
a free trade area as a CIS country, something that would directly concern our interests. We 
were told that no, you are not a party in this process, we are not going to discuss it with 
you."
Eventually, when we managed – I will stress it, by absolutely diplomatic and civilised 
means – to talk the Ukrainian officials into holding further talks with Brussels, our Western 
partners encouraged an unconstitutional regime change."127
In his speech in Valdai five months later he repeated almost in verbatim the 
point that the Western countries instigated a coup in Ukraine, after the 
Association Agreement was put on hold:
"We had discussions on all topics related to Ukraine’s association with the 
EU, persistent discussions, but I want to stress that this was done in an 
entirely civilised manner, indicating possible problems, showing the obvious 
reasoning and arguments. Nobody wanted to listen to us and nobody wanted 
to talk. They simply told us: this is none of your business, point, end of 
discussion. Instead of a comprehensive but – I stress – civilised dialogue, it 
all came down to a government overthrow; they plunged the country into 
chaos, into economic and social collapse, into a civil war with enormous 
127 The Kremlin 24 May 2014.
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casualties"128
Détente of Phase 2 in this case was so short-lived and the wording so 
similar to Phase 1, that it may be questioned whether ít meant anything at 
all to Putin in the first place. The interesting part of this exchange, however, 
is the fact that the Association Agreement was business between EU and 
Ukraine. United States had very little to do with it, if anything. However, in 
a contrast with an earlier view, it is now EU, and not the US, that incited the 
revolution in Ukraine. At times, it has been both them together.129 The 
mismatch is not surprising. Putin typically avoided naming the supposed 
background instigators of Ukrainian revolution, or of other color revolutions 
for that matter. As we have seen, usually they are called "colleagues", 
"partners" or simply "they". I believe that the vague wording is intended 
primarily for the home audiences, to create flexible image of Russia's 
opponents in the international system. "They" can play multiple parts, after 
all. If no one nation or an administration is identified as the prime cause of 
the conflict, the idea of aggressive outsiders can be used indefinitely and in 
a wide variety of situations. It allows Putin to constitute and enhance a 
polarized view of world politics where Russia occupies one side and 
Western countries the other one. This tactic was already in use in 2007, 
when Putin preferred not to name those, who in his opinion, were turning 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) into an 
apparatus of foreign policy goals of certain, also unnamed, countries.130
Of course, it is hard to to acertain whether conflictual dialogue was 
consciously invoked in order to polarize international relations, and rally the 
populace behind current Russian administration. However, the effects that 
the Ukrainian crisis has had on political views Russian citizens can be 
determined. Levada-Center, an independent Russian research organization, 
found in May 2014 that 71% Russians thought relations with US were bad, 
a stark turn from 44% in January. The low point was reached in January 
2015, when 81% thought the relationship between the two countries to be 
128 The Kremlin 24 Oct 2014.
129 See, for, example, The Kremlin 24 May 2014.
130 The Kremlin 10 Feb 2007.
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bad. These were the worst numbers recorded since the year 1990. Similar 
declining curve was also observed in perceptions of Russia's relations with 
EU and Ukraine, although these ratings did not reach numbers as low as 
with United States.131 At the same time Putin's personal approval rating 
surged higher. It rose 11% in just one month between February and March 
2014 to 80%, and kept improving throughout the summer of 2014. 
Incidentally, Putin's approval rating reached an all-time132 high in October 
2014, Phase 3, with 88% of Russians approving his actions.133
Approval ratings that high should be treated with a healthy dose of 
suspicion, even if Levada has a reputation of independence and accuracy. 
When asked directly, many Russians might try to avoid giving a negative 
opinion. However, another ongoing survey by Levada-center asks Russians 
to independently name 5 or 6 politicians or public figures they trust, and the 
results followed a similar pattern there. In February 2014, 36% of 
respondents named Putin as a trusted figure, and just one month later the 
number had soared to 51%. The yearly high of 60% was reached in October 
2014, having developed in line with the approval rating. Public trust for 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also improved in the same manner, 
pointing to an increased satisfaction for Russian foreign policy as the crisis 
evolved.134 Putin's speeches that emphasized the polarized view of Russia 
versus the West were surely not the only cause, perhaps not even a major 
cause, of the perception of declining international relations. The surveys, 
however, indicate that they resonated well with the Russian public. 
The role of shaping public opinion in support of political strategy 
should not be underestimated, especially in questions of war and peace. 
131 Levada-Center: Отношение к странам. Отношение к США; Отношение к ЕС; Отношение к  
Украине (Eng. Relations with countries. Relations with USA; Relations with EU; Relations with  
Ukraine. In the web page of Levada-Center. <http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-
stranam/>, retrieved  28 Apr 2016.
132 Shared with September 2008, when Russia fought a brief war with Georgia.
133 Levada-Center: Одобрение органов власти: Одобрение деятельности Владимира Путина (Eng:  
Approval of Government Authorities. Approval of the activities of Vladimir Putin). In the web page of 
Levada-Center. <http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/>, retrieved 28 Apr 2016.
134 Levada-Center (2015): Январские рейтинги одобрения и доверия. Назовите, пожалуйста, 5-6  
политиков, общественных деятелей, которым вы более всего доверяете (Eng. The January  
approval and trust ratings. Please name 5-6 politicians, public figures, whom do you trust the most)? 
In the web page of Levada-Center.
<http://www.levada.ru/2015/01/28/yanvarskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-3/>, retrieved 28 Apr 
2016.
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Domestic pressure for peace or a moral condemnation of war may end up 
compelling leaders.135 This notion is especially important in the context of 
Ukraine, with its numerous ties to Russia. Aggression against a fraternal 
people, as Putin called Ukrainians136, would be poorly tolerated. For this 
reason alone, it seems imperative for Putin to constitute enemy images of 
Ukrainian government and the West, and, on the other hand, keep the public 
uninformed about the true extent of Russian military involvement in the 
Donbass region. A cooperative communication strategy of Phase 2 was 
tremendously important in this sense. It is possible and even likely that it 
was primarily targeted at domestic audience rather than at the international 
one. It allowed Putin to present a cooperative side of himself, while 
preserving the conflictual image of the West. This strategy has been present 
throughout the crisis in the framing of dissidents as stooges of the West and, 
consequently, color revolutions as anti-Russian. So far this strategy of 
conflictual rhetoric seems to have worked. At least in the light of approval 
ratings, Putin's position has became significantly stronger, reducing the 
likelihood of a color revolution in Russia.
4.6 Proactivity and Soviet Instrumental Tactics
Drawing lines between Putin's Operational Code and that of the classical 
Bolsheviks may be tempting because of Putin's KGB background and the 
roots of Operational Code analysis itself. In depth analysis would probably 
have little practical use, however. An integral part of Leites's approach to 
Operational Code was the ideal type of a Good Bolshevik that would 
persistently adhere to ideology as defined by Lenin and Stalin. Putin is 
certainly not a Communist, so at best we might be able point out that he 
agrees here and there with the old Bolshevik strategy. 
There is, however, an interesting connection between Alexander 
George's analysis of Soviet instrumental tactics and Putin's Opcode changes 
135 Mintz – DeRouen, 131.
136 The Kremlin 18 Mar 2014.
62
between the three Phases. While George used Leites as a basis of his 
analysis, this part does not depend on ideology, but rather on how one takes 
action in international politics. George pointed out that despite believing in 
the inevitable victory of Communism, Bolsheviks thought it would not 
happen without effort, and consequently had to be consistently pushing the 
history to the right direction. Foreign policy was a part of this push and was 
accordingly seen as a game of opposing sides with clear winners and losers. 
A failure to take advantage of a situation was thought to effectively to be a 
net loss for the Bolshevik side. This view in turn resulted in a need to assess 
and choose proper tactics advance ones position.137 We can ignore the 
ideological background here and just focus on the fact, that this approach to 
international relations resulted in a very proactive way to conduct foreign 
policy. This proactivity, rather than ideology, seems to be the greatest 
connection between Putin and his predecessors in Soviet Union, and also 
helps to explain his flexible instrumental tactics in Phase 2. 
George explained that Bolsheviks avoided setting single goals in a 
conflict situation, but rather tried to extract the greatest gains possible, while 
at the same time avoiding recklessness that might jeopardize the whole 
cause. In order to choose the proper course of action, there was a great need 
to assess what was "'objectively possible'" in any given political situation. 
George used the phrase "optimizing strategy" to describe the resulting way 
to approach foreign policy, invoking an image of tweaking with tactics as 
necessary. The need to maximize gains resulted in a gradual pursuit of 
multiple objectives and stopping when nothing more could be achieved. 
This pursuit was to be done carefully, minding the power balance between 
all actors, and calculating and managing risks of long-term costs against 
short-term gains. Soviet leaders avoided adventurism. On the other hand, 
George pointed out that they did "'push to the limit'" when they saw a 
possibility of further gains. Concessions from enemies were seen as a sign 
of weakness, which only invited further action. On the other hand, an 
equally important counterpoint to these aggressive instrumental tactics was 
level-headedness. Bolsheviks were not to be carried away by the early 
victories and had to "'know when to stop'". Gains could then be solidified at 
137 George, 205-206.
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the negotiation table for the time being, and the conflict be settled, until new 
opportunities to advance would arise.138 In short, Bolsevik strategy was 
realpolitik in its rawest form. Mearsheimer considers this behavior to be an 
inherent part of Great Power politics.139
Putin's shifting Operational Codes and the developments in the crisis 
are congruent with this strategy. Of course, it is difficult to prove that this 
part of Bolshevik strategy has survived the ideology that created it. 
Furthermore, changing Opcode itself is not an indicator of this strategy. As 
studies concerning US presidents Kennedy and Clinton have demonstrated, 
significant short-term belief changes in crisis environment are nothing 
unusual.140 However, there is evidence that Putin subscribes to some form of 
Political Realism. His concern of strategic balance as a way to peace and 
want for an even standing with United States is a textbook example Waltz's 
defensive Neorealism.141 Putin's idea that Western countries are cynical 
power players is a case in point. Subscribing to defensive Neorealism 
indicates that Putin's goals are limited, although this might be cold comfort 
for Russia's neighbors, who in a bipolar world would fall into its sphere of 
influence like they did during the Cold War.
On the other hand, in the context of single events, belief into any 
kind of Realism might translate to ruthless action. There are few indicators 
that Russia has been extracting gains in a gradual manner similar to "Push 
to the limit" strategy. First we should observe the gradual development of 
the conflict. Russia's opening move in the crisis was a quick annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014. Judging from Putin's speeches, it has been the 
baseline bare minimum goal that Russia had hoped to achieve. Having 
quickly been incorporated in the federation according to Russian laws, its 
importance to Russia should be thought greater than that of other regions in 
Ukraine. The civil disorder in Eastern Ukraine intensified in the following 
May, and Ukraine then attempted to crush it with a military operation during 
summer. Putin's rhetoric became a lot more peace-oriented during this 
period as the Opcode of Phase 2 has shown. The immediate goal seems to 
138 George, 206-211.
139 Mearsheimer, 34.
140 See, for example, Marfleet; Schafer, Mark – Crichlow, Scott.
141 See, for example, Waltz, 174-175.
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have been freezing the conflict, before Ukraine might retake the areas it had 
lost. Ukraine came close to crushing the Separatists late in this period, but 
their succesful counterattack ended this possibility. Ceasefire of First Minsk 
Accords, established that Ukraine could not retake Donbass region with 
military force. It had to negotiate with the Separatists. It should be noted 
that the status of Crimea was not part of this agreement, and has not been on 
the negotiation table since. The first gradual step has more or less been 
achieved, and the focus of the international community has been transferred 
elsewhere. This might not have been the case, if the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine had not been the focal point of the crisis ever since April 2014.
Russia has had to manage its involvement, namely the use of its 
Armed Forces, carefully in various points of the crisis. Nothing definite can 
be said about the amount of Russian support, munitions and troops given to 
the Separtist side. However, it can be said that too much Russian aid might 
provoke the West into a serious confrontation with Russia and too little 
might lead to the annihilation of Separatist forces and removal of the 
Donbass region from Russia's sphere of influence, bringing the focus back 
to Crimea. This strategy worked fairly well until the plane crash of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17, as  before it the Western sanctions did not target Russia's 
economy and posed no serious threat to Russia as a country. The sanctions 
themselves may not have constrained Russian action as much as Western 
politicians might hope, as the counterattack in late Phase 2 points out that 
Russia remained commited to its objectives. However, a further advance 
into Western Ukraine might have been too much at this point and could 
have resulted in a serious backlash. If Putin made the decision to negotiate, 
at this point he knew, "when to stop".
However, while the period from late November 2014 onwards is not 
covered by this thesis, we can see that the result of First Minsk Accords was 
not enough neither for Separatists nor, presumably, for Russia. Military 
operations resumed after brief pause, and the result was another gradual 
victory in the form of Second Minsk Accords, where the Separatist side 
controlled a larger land area than after the first ceasefire. This result seems 
to be more acceptable and the ceasefire has since held. The experience is 
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not unfamiliar to Russia, and the War in Donbass seems to be shaping into a 
mold of a frozen conflict in the vein of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
Georgia. The international focus moved since towards Syria, where Russia 
initiated a major military operation, this time supporting the Syrian 
government. However, as far as the Ukrainian crisis is concerned, more 
possible gradual achievements remain. Crimea is still separated from 
Russian mainland by a small strip of land under Ukrainian control, but 
whether this short land area is past the limit is another question. As of May 
2016, it has been.
4.7 Weaknesses in VICS Analysis
Many of Putin's speeches reveal an inherent weakness of statistical Opcode 
analysis and quantitative methods in general. One extremely conflictual 
utterance can be overshadowed by many cooperative ones, as seems to be 
the case with Putin's Opcodes. VICS analysis is designed to mitigate this 
problem by weighing scores in accordance with the intensity of the 
utterance. The results for this can be found in Phase 2 prepared statements, 
where several index values rushed towards the cooperative extreme due to 
weighing of Reward. Even then, however, there remains the question of 
what is truly important in any statement or a speech. Putin's instrumental 
tactics are dominated by Appeals in all phases in both Tables. Appeal is a 
very low cost -tactic. No promises are given and nothing tangible to support 
good intentions is not shown. It does not tie ones hands and, because it is 
not linked to any future action, it is hard to be caught with a lie. Altogether, 
there is very little risk in simply appealing to ones good senses. Very few 
politicians try to appear warlike and aggressive, quite the contrary. This can 
be seen in Putin's speech to State Duma as well. It should be noted that right 
after promising to "respond" to Western aggression, Putin was quick to 
remind everyone that Russia will be a force of good in the world. The 
wording is vague enough that the promise amounts to nothing. It seems 
clear, that the most noteworthy content here is the accusation that certain 
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elements in the West might resort to subversion and even giving support to 
treasonous acts in Russian domestic sphere, and that Russia is prepared to 
act accordingly.142
After reviewing results of VICS analysis for Putin's Opcode, I am 
not sure that Operational Code analysis takes into account the severity of 
these claims enough. Perhaps extremely cooperative and conflictual 
utterances should be weighed more heavily. However, in Putin's case the 
effect on Opcode scores would probably not be great, as the number of 
positive deeds for Other is close to the amount of negative ones in all 
Phases. In practice, Putin's mixed or slightly friendly P-1 value is the 
product of many contrasting deeds and some Appeals by the Other. The 
program cannot, of course, differentiate between important deeds and minor 
ones. It treats them all equally. For now, it seems that the easiest way to 
make the distinction between the two is to analyze the content more 
thoroughly after VICS indices are calculated. In Putin's case, he probably 
believes the world of international politics to be far more conflictual and 
dangerous than what the numbers (P-1) indicate. The qualitative evidence 
pointing to this direction is simply overwhelming, especially considering 
that the favorable values were calculated from speeches held in a midst of 
an international crisis. The stability and harmony in Putin's mind are not 
caused by good will between people, but by international agreements, which 
guarantee that national interests of all major players are taken in account. 
He is also adamant in saying that this is simply not the case in today's 
international politics, resulting in a world steeped in conflict.143
 
142 The Kremlin 18 Mar 2014.
143 The Kremlin 24 Oct 2014.
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Conclusion
I have tried to demonstrate the utility of analyzing short-term belief changes by using 
the full palette of options provided by the Operational Code construct. The choice of 
commiting neither to prepared nor to spontaneous speeches and employing a three-
phase division has provided results, which otherwise would have been left unnoticed. 
Analyzing sources with more in-depth methods also provided encouraging results, 
which helped to put the VICS values into context. Phase 2 shows significant changes in 
Putin's beliefs, but only in material generated from prepared statements. Changes may 
have resulted from several factors, including a threat of increased Western involvement, 
as well as from the need to freeze the conflict at an advantageous situation. However, it 
seems clear that the changes represent a tactical readjustment rather than a genuine 
switch to a more cooperative foreign policy orientation. Putin seems to believe that a 
cooperative rhetoric is useful in conflict situations, although it is unclear whether it is 
used to appeal to domestic or international audiences. I suggest that the more important 
target was the domestic audience, as a way draw attention away from Russia's military 
operation. 
The results seem to indicate that Putin has a particular baseline Operational 
Code, which seems to be relatively durable, particularly with regards to master beliefs. 
There is also an indication that, besides shocking effects, context effects can lead to 
great short-term variations in Operational Codes. This was most apparent in Phase 2 
prepared statements, which stood out from the rest of the indices. This points to the 
obvious conclusion that extreme care should be taken with regards to choosing primary 
sources. This thesis had to use what was available on the website of the presidential 
administration, and, consequently used as much of it as possible. The achieved result 
was intended, and worked for the favor of research design, but other studies may need 
to take a different approach. When calculating long-term Operational Codes, it seems 
that sampling is especially important in minimizing the effect of short-term variations. 
On the other hand, the fact that Operational Codes calculated from spontaneous 
comments and prepared statements resembled each other closely, with the exception of 
Phase 2, indicates that both of these sources are reliable indicators of Putin's beliefs. 
Furthermore, it shows that either Putin does not depend on speechwriters to convey his 
ideas or that the speechwriters are very competent in capturing them.
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Regarding Putin's political strategy, VICS did not perform as well as it could 
have. VICS scores indicated that Putin had a slightly friendly view of Other, despite the 
fact that the content of his speeches indicates the opposite. Solely qualitative analysis 
would have certainly come to the conclusion that Putin believes the West to be very 
hostile. This indicates that qualitative methods continue to have use in Operational 
Code analysis. Regarding Russia's own strategy, however, VICS performed admirably. 
It captured Putin's belief in the utility of cooperative communication strategy, as well as 
the belief that Russia stands for cooperation in world politics. It should be stressed that 
this belief does not necessarily translate to cooperative action, as we have seen during 
the Ukrainian crisis. However, combined with the hostile view of the West, it does 
indicate that Putin believes that his vision about international politics is not met, and the 
West continues to foil Russia's plans to have an international standing equal to that of 
the United States.
The results suggest that Operational Code construct can be used in a number of 
new ways for future research. Putin's speech in Munich in the year 2007 seems to have 
been the watershed between the old cooperative foreign policy orientation and the new 
confrontational approach. For long-term Operational Code analysis, this may be the 
best place to put the Phase division line in order to see if Putin's beliefs about politics 
changed along with the strategy. It would also confirm the baseline Operational Code, 
which only seems to be apparent here. As for short-term studies on belief change, the 
time period could be extended to include events up to and after the Second Minsk 
Accords. It might be interesting to see, if Putin's Operational Codes changed during this 
period in a similar manner. Depending on source material, this might reveal more about 
Putin's approach to solidifying gains or about the context effects that affect Operational 
Codes.
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Appendix 1: VICS Equations
Equations behind each VICS index: adapted from Walker, Schafer and Young.144
P-1. Nature of the Political Universe. Index: % Positive Other Attributions minus % 
Negative Other Attributions. Range: -1,0 = Conflictual...+1.0 Cooperative
P-2. Realization of Political Values. Index: Mean Intensity of Other 
Conflict/Cooperation Transitive Verb Attributions for Scale with Values -3, -2. -1, +1, 
+2, +3. To make the scale more comparable the mean is divided by 3. Range: -1.0 
pessimistic...+1.0 optimistic. Cases of zero are omitted from the index.
P-3. Political Future. Index [1 minus IQV], where IQV equals the Index of Qualitative 
Variation: the ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to 
the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same 
number of variable classifications Range: 0.00 Lowest...1.0 Highest predictability
P-4. Control over Historical Development. Index Self Attributions divided by [Self 
Attributions plus Other Attributions]. Range: 0.00 Other Locus of Control...+1.0 Self 
Locus of Control.
P-5. Role of Chance. Index: 1 minus [Predictability Index multiplied by the Control 
Over Historical Development index]. Range: 0.00 Lowest...1.0 Highest Role of Chance
I-1. Strategy. Index equals % of Positive Self Attributions minus % Negative Self 
Attributions. Range: -1.0 Conflictual Strategy... +1.0 Cooperative Strategy.
I-2. Tactics. Index: Mean Intensity of Self Conflict/Copperation Attributions for Scale 
with Values of -3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3. To make the scale more comparable to others, the 
mean is divided  by 3. Range: -1.0 Very Conflictual Tactics...+1.0 Very Cooperative 
Tactics. Cases of zero are omitted from the index.
I-3. Risk Orientation. Index: [1-IQV] for self attributions. Range: 0.00 Risk Averse 
(Low Predicatability)...1.0 Risk Acceptant (High Predictability).
I-4a. Timing of Cooperation vs. Conflict. Index: Shift Propensity is 1 minus Absolute 
Value of [% Positive Self-Attributions minus % Negative Self-Attributions]. Range: 
144  Walker – Schafer – Young, 178-181.
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0.00 Low Shift Propensity...1.0 High Shift Propensity.
I-4b. Timing of Words vs. Deeds. Index: Shift Propensity is 1 minus Absolute Value of 
[% Words minus % Deeds]. Range: Low Shift Propensity...1.0 High Shift Propensity.
After 1998 and set of indices measuring the Utility of different means has been added to 
the method, while a summary index of self versus other attributions devised by Schafer 
et al. in 1998 is no longer in common use: Utility indexes are sourced from Schafer and 
Walker.145
I-5. Utility of Punish: The sum of all self utterances Punish divided by sum of all 
utterances.
I-5. Utility of Threaten: The sum of all self utterances Threaten divided by sum of all 
utterances.
I-5. Utility of Oppose: The sum of all self utterances Oppose divided by sum of all 
utterances.
I-5. Utility of Support: The sum of all self utterances Support divided by sum of all 
utterances.
I-5. Utility of Promise: The sum of all self utterances Promise divided by sum of all 
utterances.
I-5. Utility of Reward: The sum of all self utterances Reward divided by sum of all 
utterances.
Sources
Primary Sources
Phase 1 speeches
The Kremlin (18 Mar 2014): Address by President of the Russian Federation. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603>
145  Schafer Mark – Walker, Stephen G, 37-38.
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The Kremlin (29 Apr 2014): Answers to jouranlists' questions following the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council summit. In the official internet resources of the President 
of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20880>
The Kremlin (7 May 2014): Press statements and replies to journalists' questions. In 
the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20973>
The Kremlin (24 May 2014): Meeting with heads of leading international news 
agencies. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21090>
The Kremlin (4 Jun 2014): Vladimir Putin's interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV 
channel. In the official internet resources of the President of 
Russia.<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/45832>
The Kremlin (6 Jun 2014): Answers to journalist's questions. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/45869>
The Kremlin  (12 Jun 2014): Response to a journalist's question about the peace plan 
in Ukraine. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/45955>
The Kremlin (24 Jun 2014): Press statements and answers to journalists' questions  
following Russian-Austrian talks. In the official internet resources of the President of 
Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46060>
The Kremlin (1 Jul 2014): Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent  
representatives. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46131>
The Kremlin (11 Jul 2014): Interview to Prensa Latina and ITAR-TASS. In the official 
internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46190>
The Kremlin (15 Jul 2014): Interview given to Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46218>
The Kremlin (Jul 17 2014): Answers to journalists' questions. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. 
72
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46236>
Phase 2 speeches
The Kremlin (21 Jul 2014): Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46262>
The Kremlin (22 Jul 2014): Security Council meeting. In the official internet resources 
of the President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46305>
The Kremlin (15 Aug 2014): Press statements following meeting with President of  
Finland Sauli Ninistö. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46458>
The Kremlin (27 Aug 2014): Answers to journalist' questions following working visit to  
Belarus. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46495>
The Kremlin (29 Aug 2014): President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed Novorossiya  
militia. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46506>
The Kremlin (1 Sep 2014): Reply to a journalist's question during a visit to North-
Eastern Federal University. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46524>
The Kremlin (3 Sep 2014): Answers to journalists' questions following a working visit  
to Mongolia. In the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46555>
Phase 3 speeches
The Kremlin (12 Sep 2014): Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
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<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46605>
The Kremlin (12 Sep 2014): Answers to journalists' questions. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46612>
The Kremlin (1 Oct 2014): Security Council meeting. In the official internet resources 
of the President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46709>
The Kremlin (10 Oct 2014): Commonwealth of Independent States summit. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46763>
The Kremlin (Oct 15 2014): Interview to Politika newspaper. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46806>
The Kremlin (17 Oct 2014): Answers to journalists' questions following visit to Italy. In 
the official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46827>
The Kremlin (24 Oct 2014): Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. In the 
official internet resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46860>
Other speeches
The Kremlin (10 Feb 2007): Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy. In the official internet resources of the President of 
Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>
74
The Kremlin (16 Apr 2015): Direct Line with Vladimir Putin. In the official internet 
resources of the President of Russia. 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49261>
Other Sources
Survey results by Levada-Center.
Levada-Center: Одобрение органов власти: Одобрение деятельности Владимира 
Путина (Eng: Approval of Government Authorities. Approval of the activities of  
Vladimir Putin). In the web page of Levada-Center. 
<http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/>
Levada-Center: Отношение к странам. Отношение к США; Отношение к ЕС;  
Отношение к Украине (Eng. Relations with countries. Relations with USA; Relations  
with EU; Relations with Ukraine. In the web page of Levada-Center. 
<http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/>
Levada-Center (2015): Январские рейтинги одобрения и доверия. Назовите,  
пожалуйста, 5-6 политиков, общественных деятелей, которым вы более всего  
доверяете (Eng. The January approval and trust ratings. Please name 5-6 politicians,  
public figures, whom do you trust the most)? In the web page of Levada-Center.
<http://www.levada.ru/2015/01/28/yanvarskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-3/>
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